Board composition and capital structure choice by Mens, Vic
Combined Master Thesis 
 












The present study addresses how and the extent to which the composition of the board impacts 
the capital structure choices made by a firm. In particular, the fraction of independent directors, 
the degree of gender- and nationality diversity, board size, and CEO duality have been 
analysed. By using a unique panel dataset, this study shows that firms that have a stronger 
presence of female directors on the board issue more equity as compared to debt. In particular, 
the results show that when the presence of female directors in the board is at least 30%, firms 
(1) hold less internal capital as compared to short-term debt and (2) hold more external equity 
as compared to long-term debt. The results also provide evidence that firms with a larger 
fraction of independent directors on the board, a larger board size, or CEO who also holds the 
position of the chairman, use more risky financing sources in their capital structure. On the 
contrary, firms that have a more nationality diverse board tend to be less levered, and in 
particular use less long-term debt. Overall, this study echoes the findings in previous studies 
that certain board attributes should not be ignored in capital structure models.   
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In recent years, firms have come under increasing pressure to reform the composition of the 
board of directors. In particular, the call to firms to promote gender equality within the board 
is one of the most prominent areas of attention. California is on the forefront of regulating 
gender equality in the United States, as it is the first state that mandates a gender quota for 
female directors on corporate boards2. In 2018, the Governor of California passed a law that 
requires any publicly held firm headquartered in California to hold a representative number of 
female directors on its board by the end of 2019. In Europe, the push for gender diversity 
already set foot in 2008, when Norway mandated public limited firms that at least 40% of both 
genders must be represented on their boards (Storvik & Teigen, 2010). Following this example, 
Iceland enacted a corporate gender quota in 2013, and at this moment the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands are contemplating the same (Dobson & Rastad, 2018).  Despite that there are 
certain ethical arguments for the increased regulatory focus on the composition of the board, 
most arguments are of an economic nature (Campbell, 2008).  
 
First, it must be elucidated that the board of directors has, inter alia, the responsibility to 
oversee the activities and the performance of the firm and has the jurisdiction to sanction or 
replace executive directors (carter et al., 2010). Therefore, it is argued that when the board is 
composed in such a that it effectively fulfils its duties, corporate governance and consequently 
firm performance could be improved (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Over the past decade the 
inherent role of the board of directors has received considerable interest, resulting in a recent 
trend of research into the impact of different board composition attributes. For example, there 
have been studies that test the association between the fraction of female board directors and 
firm performance (e.g. Adams & Ferreira; Gordini and Rancati, 2017); studies that establish 
whether board independence reduces earnings management (e.g. Hutchinson et al., 2015; 
Sultana, 2015); and studies that consider the economic consequences of CEO duality3 (e.g. 
Adams et al., 2005; Tang, 2017).  
 
This study contributes to this growing body of literature by testing whether the composition of 
the board of directors influences the capital structure of firms. Given that the decision-making 
                                                 
2 The legislation, formally referred to as the senate Bill No. 826, concerns publicly held corporations 
headquartered in the state California.  
3 CEO duality occurs when the CEO is the same person as the chair of the board. 
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on capital structure is influenced by the management team and the board has the responsibility 
to align the actions of the managers with the interests of the shareholders (Myers, 2001), I 
expect to find a relationship between the board of directors’ composition and the capital 
structure of firms. The contribution of this study is threefold. First, this study relies on a very 
recent dataset with board-specific information collected over the period of 2010 to 2017, while 
the majority of the research builds on a sample from before 2010 (e.g. Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Alves et al., 2015). Since the regulatory attention on the unequal distribution of board members 
has increased considerably in recent years, the present study offers a better insight into the 
current situation. Second, this study brings the research on board composition to the next level 
by incorporating several board-specific attributes that are, as per my knowledge, not been 
examined before in the current context. For example, apart from the inclusion of a wide range 
of gender-related measures that account for the impact of gender diversity, the present study 
controls for nationality diversity, a factor that is often ignored due to data limitations. Finally, 
being one of the first to congregate the pecking order theory with the study on board 
composition, this study paves the way for further extensive research. 
 
To examine the association between the board of directors’ composition and capital structure, 
this study will build on the assumptions of the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
In short, this theory argues that information asymmetries between managers and outside 
investors inflate the costs of external financing and restrict firms the access to capital markets. 
Since managers know more about the future prospects of the firm, outside investors will be 
cautious when a firm issues external capital and will demand higher returns as the degree of 
information asymmetry increases. Given this, the theory predicts that because information 
asymmetries between managers and outside investors are more severe for riskier securities, 
firms prefer to finance with internal capital4, and if external financing is needed, primarily with 
(short-term) debt rather than with external equity in order to avoid issuing securities at high 
costs.  
 
Nevertheless, according to Alves et al. (2015) firms become more inclined to issue external 
capital, and in particular the riskier securities when information asymmetries are being 
moderated. In the vein of Amaro de Matos & Mergulhão (2018), the present study conjectures 
that when the board of directors is composed in such a way that it effectively reduces 
                                                 
4 Information asymmetries are only relevant for external financing (Myers, 2001). 
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information asymmetries between the management and outside investors, one could see a shift 
in the use of financing sources. By using a unique panel dataset that captures a wide range of 
board-specific characteristics for 504 firms over a period of 10 years, this study addresses how 
and the extent to which the composition of the board affects the capital structure choices made 
by a firm.  The focus of this study will be on, but not limited to, the role of gender diversity in 
the board. In particular, the fraction of independent directors, the degree of gender- and 
nationality diversity, board size, and CEO duality will be analysed.  
 
After controlling for a wide-range of control variables, I find that firms that have a stronger 
presence of female on the board tend to issue more equity as compared to debt. In particular, 
the results show that when the presence of female directors gets more substantial5, firms tend 
to (1) use less internal capital as compared to short-term debt and (2) hold more external equity 
as compared to long-term debt. However, this study also reveals that when boards are getting 
more heterogeneous, firm tend to rely more on safer financing sources such as internal capital. 
Overall, the results contribute well to the fierce debate about how and whether the composition 
of corporate boards needs be reformed. At the very least, the empirical results question the 
recent trend in one-size-fits-all rule-based reform proposals such as strict gender quotas. 
 
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 elucidates the theoretical foundation and existing 
literature on capital structure and discusses the influence of board composition as found in 
previous studies. In addition, I will state the research hypotheses that will serve as a guidance 
throughout this paper. Section 3 deals with the methodology and research design and Section 4 
presents the empirical results. In Section 5 several robustness checks are performed and in 
Section 6 the results and implications are discussed in depth. The main conclusions are 
summarized in Section 7. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on capital structure theory is generally separated in two main streams of thought: 
(i) the trade-off theory and (ii) pecking-order theory. The theoretical framework of both theories 
can be used to predict the associations between firm characteristics and the financing choices 
                                                 
5 In accordance to Joecks et al. (2012), this study classifies the presence of women as substantial if at least 30% 
of board members are female. 
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made by the firm (Amaro de Matos, 2001). Complementary to both the trade off- and the 
pecking order-theory is the agency theory. The latter is often used to explain the deviations 
from the main predictions and provides rationale for the influence of the board composition on 
financial decision-making (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). This section attempts to shed light 
on the main capital structure theories and reviews the empirical evidence as found in previous 
studies. In addition, this section elaborates on the association between capital structure and 
board composition from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Accordingly, the research 
hypotheses will be stated. 
2.1 The irrelevance theorem 
Modern thinking on capital structure theory has been originated from the seminal paper of 
Modigliani & Miller (1958). The authors created a framework through which they explained 
how the capital structure of a firm is related to the value of a firm. This framework is often cited 
as the irrelevance theorem and will therefore be named accordingly. The irrelevance theorem 
states that in a world of perfect capital markets (i.e. in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, 
taxes, trading costs and bankruptcy costs), the capital structure is irrelevant to the value of a 
firm. Modigliani & Miller (1958) rationalized this proposition by illustrating that the value of 
a firm should be equal to the present value of the total expected future cash flows that are 
generated by the assets of the firm. As such, choosing a certain amount of debt and equity to 
finance these assets will divide the future cash flows among debt and equity investors but will 
not alter the total cash flows that are generated by the assets itself (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Since 
the value of a firm depends solely on the expected future cash flows, the financing mix is 
irrelevant to the value of the firm. Although theoretically intuitive, the underlying assumptions 
of the irrelevance theorem do not hold in the real world. Nevertheless, the fundamental ideas 
were revolutionary and served as a basis for extensive future research on capital structure.  
 
2.3 Trade-off theory  
The trade-off theory posits that when market imperfections such as corporate taxes are included 
in the model, there exists an optimal level of leverage that maximizes the difference between 
the benefits and costs of debt financing. The benefits of debt are typically linked to the 
capitalization of tax shields that result from the interest payments to debt holders. In short, since 
interest is tax deductible, the total cash flows available to debt and equity holders will increase 
when debt is used in favour of equity. As a result, the total firm value increases when the 
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fraction of debt in the capital structure increases. However, this does not imply that the optimal 
capital structure consists out of 100% debt financing. Strictly speaking, the use of leverage 
comes at a cost. In general, the costs related to debt are commonly referred to as financial 
distress costs and include the costs of bankruptcy (e.g. Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973; Fama & 
French, 2002), transaction costs (e.g. Frank & Goyal, 2009) and agency costs (e.g. Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, when an increasing amount of debt is used in the capital structure, 
not only the present value of the tax shields will increase but also the present value of the 
financial distress costs. As such, the optimal level of leverage is reached when the marginal 
increase in the costs of debt will equal the marginal increase in the benefits of debt.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that distress costs play a major role in the trade-off between debt and 
equity funding, also agency costs that arise from the conflicts in interest between debt- and 
equity holders need to be considered in the trade-off model. Under the assumption that both the 
capital providers and the managers of a firm are utility maximisers, there is good reason to 
believe that managers will use their discretionary power on the firm’s investment process for 
personal benefits. Regarding the investment decisions of a firm, it must be mentioned that whilst 
bondholders are entitled to a predefined claim of the future cash flows of a firm, equity holders 
are left with the residuals. As stated by Merton (1973), equity can be seen as a call option with 
an appreciation in value as the upward potential of the underlying asset increases. The shift to 
more risky investments can cause the expected payoff to equity holders to increase at the cost 
of the debt holders. However, rational debt holders can limit the divergence in interests by 
establishing protection mechanisms in the form of debt contracts (e.g. debt covenants) and by 
taking monitoring measures to control the actions of the management (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Moreover, debt holders will require a higher rate of return on debt capital to compensate 
for the potential excessive risk taking by the management. As such, the notion that the costs 
associated with agency problems typically increase with the amount of debt in the capital 
structure could explain why the actual levels of leverage that are observed in a firm’s capital 
structure tend to be lower than optimal (Morrelec, 2004).  
 
A plethora of evidence for the trade-off theory is found in existing literature but competing 
voices criticize the importance of the input variables. With respect to the role of taxation 
benefits, Fama & French (1998) and Graham (2000) recognize the importance of the tax shields 
but find no evidence that this tax effect is of great importance for a firm’s capital structure. 
Notably, several studies turned away completely from incorporating taxation as a capital 
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structure determinant (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984). With contrasting results, Miller 
(1977) discussed the relevance of taxation benefits versus the costs associated with bankruptcy. 
The author claims that the costs of bankruptcy are disproportionately small relative to the tax 
savings that stem from the use debt. The argument to lower the debt appetite significantly based 
on expected bankruptcy costs is therefore to be rejected in his view. Morellec et al. (2012) 
developed a model which examined the importance of agency conflicts in the capital structure 
choice of a firm. According to the study, board independence and insider ownership are 
effective mechanisms to reduce the conflicts of interests between shareholders and the board of 
directors and therefore reduce agency costs. Contrarily, CEO power and CEO tenor are 
positively related to agency costs. Based on their model, there appears to be a strong relation 
between the capital structure choice of a firm and the presence of agency problems. Notably, 
firms which are highly sensitive to agency problems tend to issue less debt and restructure less 
frequently than firms which are less sensitive to agency problems.  
2.2 Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory popularized by Myers & Majluf (1984), postulates that there is a 
preferred order in which funding sources should be used. The theory is based on the notion that 
there exists a certain degree of information asymmetry between outside investors and firm 
insiders which inflates the costs of external financing. As such, the pecking order theory 
presents a model that helps to minimize the financing costs that result from asymmetric 
information problems. Within the model, there are three sources of funding available: retained 
earnings, equity, and debt. First, retained earnings are not associated with asymmetric 
information problems since it is internal capital. As a result, this will be the first source of 
capital to be used when funding is needed. When a firm needs to enter the capital markets for 
external financing, either debt or equity can be issued. Debt securities are strictly less risky than 
equity since it comes with a prioritized claim on the cash flows of the firm and/ or carry 
collateral (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Equity holders are only entitled to the residual claim and 
are therefore subject to serious adverse selection problems. Therefore, the issuance of debt 
should be preferred over equity.  
 
The idea behind the pecking order theory is that the management of a firm has more information 
about the expected cash flows of a company than outside investors and is therefore better able 
to give an appropriate valuation of the firm (Myers & Majluf, 1984). If the management decides 
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to sell equity to raise funding instead of debt, rational investors will question why this source 
of funding is used. According to the adverse selection theory, managers will only issue equity 
if they believe that the current market value of the firm is overvalued (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
On the contrary, if the management believes that the firm is undervalued, it will refuse to give 
up on the expected future cash flows against a discount and will turn to the debt market to raise 
funding. Under the consideration that investors are rational and aware of this problem, a higher 
adverse selection premium is demanded for equity than for debt. The relative increase in 
financing costs when equity is used instead of debt forms the second financing order 
consideration. Accordingly, if internal capital is not available, funding must be raised from debt 
capital. Here we must make a distinction in the seniority of payments between senior debt and 
junior debt and will prefer senior debt over junior debt since the former is less sensitive to 
asymmetric information. Moreover, we must make a distinction with regard to the tenor of the 
debt security. Since the level of information asymmetry is limited for short-term debt relatively 
to long-term debt, shorter tenors should be preferred. The least preferred source of funding that 
should be considered is the issuance of equity and should only be used if the firm has reached 
its debt capacity limit (Fama & French, 2005).  
 
It has become clear that information asymmetry problems and agency costs are key 
determinants in explaining capital structure choices made by firms. Although there is 
supporting evidence for several predictions of the pecking order theory (Frank & Goyal, 2003), 
it does not capture all the variation in the capital structure choices made by firms (e.g. Fama & 
French, 2002; Lemmon & Zenders, 2010).  
2.3 Market timing theory 
Notwithstanding the fact that the aforementioned theories are the main streams of thought in 
the realm of capital structuring, the market-timing theory is getting clear attention in recent 
literature. Baker & Wurgler (2002) argue that the capital structure of a firm is the result of 
managers attempt to align the firm’s funding needs with the conditions on the equity market. In 
this practise, the firm tends to issue equity when the market capitalization of the firm is 
considered to be overvalued and will repurchase equity from the market when the shares are 
considered to be undervalued (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Clearly, in a world of perfect capital 
markets as described in Modigliani & Miller (1958) this line of thought is invalid since current 
market values should reflect the correct price at any time. However, Taggart (1977), Baker & 
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Wurgler (2002), and Alti (2006) find that the finance decisions of firms are often dependent on 
the book-to-market ratio of the firm’s equity. As such, if this book-to-market ratio is relatively 
high, firms tend to issue more equity as compared to debt. Furthermore, Graham & Harvey 
(2001) show that the majority of CFO’s admit that market timing plays a significant role in 
financial decision making. 
 
Evidently, there is no concession or universally accepted theory that explains the capital 
structure choices made by firms. Study that shows which characteristics drive capital structure 
decisions is extensive but lacks consistency and is incomplete. A new line of research attempts 
to fill this gap by linking capital structure theory to corporate governance. Overall, literature 
evinces that corporate governance features should be present in capital structure models (Alves 
et al., 2015). I will discuss this stream of literature in detail in the following paragraph. 
2.4 The board of directors 
The initial study on capital structure determinants is mainly focussed on financial and economic 
factors. However, it has become clear that softer variables such as culture, gender, and corporate 
governance play an important role in explaining financial decision-making (e.g. Hersch & 
Farrell, 2005; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Aggarwal & Goodell, 2014). In particular, the agency 
theory provides good rationale for the association between the composition of the board and 
the capital structure choices made by firms. Following the agency theory, it is evident that the 
separation of ownership and control within firms could lead to strong conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and managers, conceptualized by the term agency problems. An 
important mechanism to reduce these agency problems and to align the interests of the managers 
with the interests of the shareholders is the board of directors. Fama & Jensen (1983) describe 
the role of the board of directors as a decision control system that serves on behalf of the 
shareholders and helps to ensure that the managers act in the best interests of the owners. In 
general, the board has the responsibility to oversee the activities and the performance of the 
firm but has also the jurisdiction to sanction or replace executive directors. The composition of 
the board is traditionally divided between the CEO, the chairman, executive directors, and non-
executive (independent) directors. However, in the context of corporate governance, board 
composition is defined in a wider sense and refers to the combination of individual 
characteristics, attributes and roles of the board members (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). The 
extensive amount of literature that is devoted to the composition of the board usually relies 
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upon the premise that monitoring by the board can improve the quality of managers’ decisions 
and subsequently, improve corporate performance (Yermack, 1996). However, evidently not 
all boards are composed in the same way and not all boards are equally effective in monitoring 
the management and in protecting the interests of the shareholders. Since the concept of agency 
problems has been a perennial subject in capital structure theory, it can be argued that the 
effectiveness of the board has a direct influence on the capital structure choices made by a firm. 
In particular, through the lens of the pecking order-theory and in conjunction with the agency 
theory, predictions can be made about the associations between the composition of the board 
and capital structure.  
 
2.4.1 Review of empirical findings  
A main issue regarding the effectiveness of the board of directors is the level of board 
independence (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Theory articulates that independent directors are 
better able to monitor the management team and hold the potential to improve the corporate 
performance by giving more objective advice and counsel (Brennan & McDermott, 2004). In 
particular, independent directors have no executive responsibilities in the firm and can therefore 
better act in the interests of the shareholders. Alves et al. (2015) examined the association 
between the percentage of independent board members and firm’s capital structure. The results 
provide evidence that board independence is positively related to the use of external financing 
sources and especially to the use of long-term debt, supporting the conviction that independent 
directors have a positive effect on reducing agency costs. In addition, Fosberg (2004) finds that 
when the CEO of a firm is not the same person as the chairman of the firm, agency costs are 
limited, and higher levels of leverage are used. This result is in line with Fama & Jensen (1983) 
and supports the notion that the separation of management and control improves the functioning 
of the board.  
 
Regarding the relation between board size and board effectiveness, the results in previous 
literature are dispersed. The optimal size of a board can be seen as a trade-off process: it needs 
to be large enough to provide the firm with the right resources and information, but still must 
be small enough to promote cohesion and efficiency. Conyon & Peck (1998) find that a large 
board size may hinder the effectiveness of the management, which results in a decrease in 
financial performance. As such, the enlargement of boards is argued to increase problems 
related to information asymmetries and corporate decision-making. In line with this result, 
Yermack (1996) argues that smaller board of directors have better monitoring and decision-
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making qualities and documents that board size and firm performance are inversely related. The 
intuition is that the costs arising from slow decision-making, poor communication and potential 
director free-riding outweigh the potential benefits from a greater monitoring capacity as the 
board size increases (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Contradicting however is the study from Coles 
et al. (2008) on the relation between firm value and board structure. The results show that firm 
performance is positively related to board size, typically driven by the number of independent 
directors. The notion is that complex firms have greater advisory requirements and are more 
susceptible to environmental uncertainties, so that independent directors add significant value 
to the effectiveness of the board. 
 
Besides the aforementioned factors, a multitude of studies have evaluated whether individual 
characteristics such as gender have an impact on board effectiveness and subsequently on 
corporate decision-making. Closely related to the present study, Alves et al. (2015) examined 
the relation between the extent of female directors in the board and the firm’s capital structure. 
The authors report that firms with a higher fraction of female directors on the board tend to use 
more external equity as compared to debt financing. Moreover, firms with more gender diverse 
boards appear to rely more on long-term financing sources than their gender homogeneous 
counterparts. However, Faccio et al. (2016) document that firms that have a female CEO or 
have female owners use less risky financing instruments and tend to rely more on internal 
capital and short-term debt. Adams & Ferreira (2009) provide evidence that gender diversity in 
the board positively relates to board effectiveness, especially for firms with weak governance 
structures. The authors report that female directors have a better attendance record in board 
meetings than men and show that increasing the extent of female directors’ results in less 
attendance problems. As a result, boards are expected to monitor the executive team better when 
the extent of female directors increases. Gordini & Rancati (2017) examined the relation 
between firm performance and board gender diversity for Italian listed companies. Results show 
that the percentage of women on the board has a positive impact on firm performance whilst 
the presence of one woman on the board on itself does not have a significant effect. This result 
is closely related to the critical mass theory which claims that a representation of at least 30% 
of female board members will be associated with better firm performance than for male 
dominated boards (Joecks et al., 2012). This result is confirmed by the study Torchia et al. 
(2011) who argue that the presence of three women in the boardroom will significantly improve 
firm performance.  
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Nevertheless, the existing body of literature leaves substantial gaps in understanding the 
impacts of the composition of the board. Although most of the research builds upon the 
argument that board effectiveness improves the quality of managers’ decisions, several 
researchers relate the impact of board composition to the signalling theory. For example, Certo 
et al. (2001) argue that the board operates as a signal mechanism to the market, meaning that 
when boards consist out of more independent directors, investors may gain greater confidence 
in the firm's potential. Kaur & Singh (2017) support this argument and provide evidence that 
board diversity is perceived as a positive quality signal and enhances the reputation of the firm. 
Petersen & Vredenburg (2009) conducted study on the link between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance. Although not directly related to the 
present study, this research provides further insights in how certain variables could act as a 
signalling mechanism to the market. Of particular interest, the authors argue that CSR-oriented 
firms appear to signal to the market that they are a secure investment, which could lead to better 
access to the capital markets and as a result, to better financial performance.  
2.5 Hypotheses development  
According to the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani & Miller (1958), managers should exploit 
any investment opportunity if the rate of return is larger is than the cost of capital. Consequently, 
characteristics of board members should not have an impact on investment and/ or capital 
structure choices. However, a plethora of empirical evidence has demonstrated the contrary. As 
previously discussed, it is clear that information asymmetry problems and agency costs are key 
determinants in explaining capital structure choices made by firms. In particular, the pecking 
order theory conjectures that information asymmetries between managers and outside investors 
inflate the costs of external financing and restrict firms the access to capital markets. As such, 
the theory predicts that since information asymmetry is more severe for riskier securities, firms 
prefer to finance with internal capital, and if outside financing is needed, primarily with (short-
term) debt rather than with external equity. Nevertheless, according to Alves et al. (2015) firms 
become more inclined to issue external capital, and in particular the riskier securities, when 
information asymmetries are being moderated. As a result, a board of directors composed in 
such a way that it effectively reduces information asymmetry problems should make it easier 
and less costly for the firm to issue external equity and (long-term) debt. This research 
complements on the pecking order theory and examines the extent to which board-specific 
 15 
factors such as board diversity, board size and leadership structure affect the capital structure 
choices made by a firm.  
 
First, the relation between board independence and agency costs has received strong attention 
from researchers (e.g. Brennan & McDermott, 2004; Alves et al., 2015). In line with the results 
that are previously discussed, independent board members hold the potential to decrease the 
level of information asymmetry between managers and capital providers. Following the 
pecking order theory, a more independent board is expected to face lower costs of external 
financing, and thus, firms with higher levels of independent board members should have better 
and cheaper access to external capital. Throughout this study I will classify the riskiness of 
(external) securities in accordance to the pecking order theory. As such, a financing source is 
regarded to be ‘safe’ when its valuation is independent of the disclosure of managers’ inside 
information (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). As previously mentioned, this will lead to the 
classification of four financing sources in which external equity capital is considered to be the 
riskiest financing source and internal equity to be the safest. Subsequently, long-term debt 
capital is riskier than short-term debt capital but less risky than external equity. With respect to 
the aforementioned arguments and clarifications, I predict the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: The higher the fraction of independent board members, the higher the fraction of risky 
securities in the firm’s capital structure. 
 
With respect to board diversity, there are several studies that emphasize on the benefits of 
gender diversity in the boardroom. Adams & Ferreira (2009) report that gender diverse boards 
are better in monitoring executive directors and show that women have a better attendance rate 
in board meetings than men. Moreover, the authors document that diverse boards are more 
likely to hold the CEO accountable for disappointing stock performance. As such, it could be 
argued that female directors contribute to lower levels of information asymmetry. Alves et al. 
(2015) document that an increased presence of female directors in the board could improve the 
effectiveness of the board, reduce information asymmetry between the management and outside 
investors, and consequently lead firms to have better access to external capital. Moreover, Kaur 
& Singh (2017) report that board gender diversity could send a positive quality signal to the 
market and could enhance the corporate reputation. As such, I expect that gender diversity in 
the board contributes to lower information asymmetry; to better capital market access; and to a 
greater use of risky financing sources by firms. Hence, I state the following two hypotheses:  
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H2a: The higher the level of gender diversity in the board, the higher the fraction of risky 
securities in the firm’s capital structure. 
H2b: The higher the level of female directors in the board, the higher the fraction of risky 
securities in the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Most study on nationality diversity on the board is focused on racial differences measured by, 
inter alia, the fraction of racial minorities on the board or by distinguishing between white and 
non-white board members (e.g. Carter et al., 2010). However, study on nationality diversity 
instead of racial diversity is limited. Nielsen & Nielsen (2013) show that nationality diversity 
could reduce external uncertainties, improve firms’ transparency and subsequently mitigate 
information asymmetry issues with the market. Moreover, the authors argue that multinational 
teams engage more in in-depth discussions, have are more problem-solving approach, and 
arrive at more creative solutions. Although not equally defined as nationality diversity, Ruigrok 
et al. (2007) find that foreign board members are more likely to be independent and are more 
effective in their task to monitor the management. As such, I expect that nationality diversity 
in the board improves the effectiveness of the board and holds the potential to decrease 
information asymmetries between the management and outside investors. Hence, I predict the 
following relation: 
 
H3a: The higher the level of nationality diversity in the board, the higher the fraction of risky 
securities in the firm’s capital structure. 
 
Turning to the role of board size, its effect on information asymmetry is unclear. In line with 
Conyon & Peck (1998) and Yermack (1996), large boards are more likely to experience 
problems in communication and decision-making, which obfuscates the effectiveness of the 
board. As a result, the boards’ capability to monitor the management and protect the interests 
of the shareholders may be affected as the board size increases. However, Coles et al. (2008) 
state that there is a positive relation between the complexity of a firm (i.e. measured by firm 
size, international exposure, and leverage) and the extent to which the firm benefits from a 
larger board. In particular interest, the authors argue that since complex firms are facing higher 
advising requirements, they will benefit from having additional expertise on the board. Hence, 
since previous studies show dispersed results, and little is known about the complexity of the 
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firms that are being analysed in the present study, I am not able to predict the relation between 
board size and the capital structure a priori.    
 
H4a: Board size is positively related to the fraction of risky securities in the firm’s capital 
structure. 
H4b: Board size is negatively related to the fraction of risky securities in the firm’s capital 
structure. 
 
CEO duality occurs when the CEO and the chairman of the board are the same person. 
According to Alves et al. (2015), boards with CEO duality are less independent and 
consequently less effective in controlling the corporate performance. As a result, the costs 
related to information asymmetries may be higher under the condition of CEO duality, leading 
firms to rely less on risky financing sources. Moreover, boards that are more independent from 
the CEO are expected to better fulfil their primary duties such as monitoring and sanctioning 
the executive directors. Since it is the responsibility of the board to control the CEO, I expect 
that CEO duality negatively impacts the functioning of the board. In line with the notion that 
asymmetric information increases the costs of external financing, I state the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H5a: CEO duality is negatively related to the fraction of risky securities in the firm’s capital 
structure. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
This study uses a balanced cross-sectional time series dataset based on the constituents of the 
S&P 500 index and the Stoxx Europe 600 index for the period of 2010 to 2017. The Stoxx 
Europe 600 is one of the biggest European indices available and provides a good reflection of 
the European stock market. The S&P 500 is an American stock market index and is based on 
the 500 largest companies with a presence in either the NASDAQ or the NYSE. In order to create 
a balanced sample set, I excluded all the firms that are not consistently present in either the 
S&P 500 or in the Stoxx Europe 600 during the period of 2010 to 2017. In line with Alves et 
al. (2015), I exclude financial firms from the sample because of their specific capital 
requirements and regulations.  
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After filtering the firm sample, I extract the data on board composition from the BoardEX 
database. In order to identify the companies from the sample, I need to convert the ticker codes 
of the index constituents, as retrieved from Compustat, into unique BoardEX identification 
codes. The reason for this is that ticker codes are not unique and can belong to multiple firms, 
and thus, using them would offer me an incorrect dataset. In converting the tickers into 
BoardEX codes extreme care must be taken. As the ticker code of a firm can belong to multiple 
firms, BoardEX will return a large number of superfluous identification codes. As a result, I 
will have to verify that the firm that belongs to the identification code is an actual constituent 
of either the S&P 500 or Stoxx Europe 600. This is done by downloading the Index 
identification codes along with the country codes and subsequently removing all the firms that 
do not belong to the initial firm sample. For all the tickers that could not be matched with the 
BoardEX identification codes, correct codes had to be found manually.  
 
After optimizing the sample set, data on board size, gender diversity and nationality diversity 
could be extracted. To extract the data on board independence and CEO duality, additional steps 
had to be taken. For example, many board members are noted multiple times in the data output 
during the same year and give therefore incorrect results when the fraction of independent board 
members is calculated. To circumvent this problem, I downloaded the individual names of all 
the board members and excluded the duplicates before computing the respective ratios. 
Regarding CEO duality, information about the role of each individual board member must be 
extracted. Subsequently, CEO duality is identified when a combination of ‘chair’ and ‘CEO’ is 
found in the title.  
 
With respect to the financial data, Information about firm fundamentals are downloaded from 
the Compustat Global: Fundamentals annual database (at the fiscal year end). Since BoardEX 
identification codes cannot be used for Compustat, I converted the BoardEX codes into ISIN 
codes. Because Compustat did not offer all the required data, I requested additional data from 
the Bloomberg database and from the Orbis Amadeus database.  After matching all the obtained 
observations with the respective firm, the database was finalized and balanced by excluding all 
firms with lacking data points. This selection procedure has resulted in a final sample of 504 
unique firms with 8 years of data.   
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3.1 Dependent variables 
To investigate the hypothesis that the composition of the board affects the capital structure of a 
firm, it is essential to define and segregate the financing sources that are available to a firm. 
Following the pecking order theory as described by Myers & Majluf (1984), there are three 
primary sources of capital available: internal equity; external equity; and debt capital. 
subsequently, debt capital can be segregated into short-term debt and long-term debt as a mean 
to capture the firm’s capital structure choice in more detail. Following the work of Alti (2006) 
and Rashid (2015), internal equity is computed as the book value of retained earnings and 
external equity is computed as the book value of total equity minus the book value of retained 
earnings. As indicated, debt capital is segregated into short-term and long-term debt. Short-
term debt is defined as the book value of current liabilities and long-term debt as the book value 
of total liabilities minus the book value of current liabilities. In calculating the leverage ratios, 
the capital structure variables are scaled by the book value of total assets.  
 
Existing literature on whether book values or market values of capital should be used in the 
computation of leverage show dispersed results. Thies & Klock (1992) and Fama & French 
(2002) argue that book ratios of leverage give a better reflection of the firm’s target debt ratio. 
Since market values of debt are not always readily available and market values of equity are 
subject to high volatility, it is presumed that using book values may better reflect the intentions 
of the management. Therefore, I will limit the present study to the use of book values of capital 
and will control for market values in the Robustness section.  
3.2 Independent variables 
This study measures the female presence on the board with the use of three variables. First, a 
board gender diversity variable will be included and will be measured by the Blau index6, one 
of the most commonly used measures of categorial diversity. Following Blau (1977), board 
gender diversity is calculated as follows: 
 
1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑘
𝑖=1            (1) 
 
                                                 
6 The Blau index is also known as the Herfindahl's index. 
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Where 𝑝𝑖 is the proportion of category 𝑖 in the group. Regarding board gender diversity, this 
implies that the Blau index for a board consisting out of six men and three women is calculated 
as one minus the sum of two thirds squared plus one third squared. Since gender will be 
categorised into two groups, namely men and women, the maximum value of the Blau index 
will be 0.50. For the sake of clarity, I transform the Blau index to a standardized form that 
ranges between zero and one. The standardized form of the Blau index is derived when the 
original formula (1) is multiplied by the equation 𝑘/(𝑘 − 1), where 𝑘 is the number of 
categories.  
 
The second gender related measure is the percentage of female directors in the board. This 
variable is strongly correlated with the Blau index for gender diversity and will therefore not 
be tested simultaneously in order to prevent multicollinearity problems. Thirdly, I include a 
dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of females in the board is at 
least 30% and takes the value of 0 otherwise. This follows the work of Joecks et al. (2012) who 
argue that board effectiveness is significantly higher when the presence of female directors on 
the board is at least 30%. In addition, the respective dichotomous variable will be referred to as 
the critical mass variable throughout this study.  
 
Besides a variable for gender diversity, this study uses a second diversity measure which 
accounts for the nationality diversity in the board. This variable will be referred to as the 
nationality mix and is calculated in a similar way as the Blau index for gender diversity. The 
value of the variable will range between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating that all board members have 
the same nationality and 1 indicating that all board members have a different nationality.  
 
In addition, a dichotomous variable is used to account for CEO duality and takes the value of 1 
if the CEO of the board is also the chair of the board and takes the value of 0 otherwise. The 
variable board size is measured by the unit per person and is not subject to any transformation. 
Lastly, we include the fraction of independent directors as a variable and is expressed as the 
ratio between the number of independent directors in the board and the total board size.  
3.3 Control variables 
In order to increase the explanatory power of the model, I will include a set of control variables 
based on Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Getzman et al. (2014). The respective control variables 
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have proven to be reliable in explaining capital structure decisions made by firms and will 
consequently help to test the relative relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variables in this study. The approach in this study limits the nature of the control 
variables to firm-specific factors and ignores macro related determinants as, inter alia, market 
risk, inflation levels, and interest rates. Although existing literature documents that 
macroeconomic factors may be of relevance in explaining capital structure choices (Baum et 
al., 2015), most researchers ignore it in their models because of data limitations (e.g. Titman & 
Wessels, 1988; Getzman et al., 2014). I will outline each control variable that is considered in 
this study and will discuss the motivations and definitions subsequently. Although the exact 
coefficient sign between the control variables and the dependent variable is not of main interest 
in this paper, I will document the predictions and underlying intuition of the explanatory power 
of the variables based on the traditional capital structure theories where relevant. Since the 
testing procedure requires a normal distribution of the error terms, all control variables are being 
logarithmized.  
 
(i) Asset tangibility: Prior research documents that the type of assets owned by a firm 
significantly influences the capital structure choice of a firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Titman 
& Wessels, 1988). According to the trade-off theory, the collateralization of assets leads to 
better investor protection and to lower asymmetric information costs. Since the valuation of 
tangible assets is less volatile than intangible assets and the value of tangible assets can be better 
determined in times of financial distress, bankruptcy costs will be lower for firms with a larger 
proportion of tangible assets on their balance sheet. Within the framework of the trade-off 
theory, the decrease in agency costs resulting from an increase in asset tangibility should result 
in higher levels of leverage obtained by the firm. Prior research empirically observed this 
relationship (e.g. Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Alves & Ferreira, 2011) and as such, this present 
study incorporates asset tangibility as a control variable. I define asset tangibility as the ratio of 
fixed assets divided by the book value of total assets. 
 
(ii) Profitability: According to the trade-off theory, profitable firms may opt for higher levels 
of debt in order to benefit from the resulting tax shields. In addition, profitable firms are less 
likely to get into bankruptcy and will therefore face lower (expected) costs of financial distress. 
In the absence of information asymmetry, these arguments lead to the prediction of a positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage. However, the pecking order theory propagates 
the contrary. As discussed in previous sections, firms will use retained earnings as the first 
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source of funding in order to avoid asymmetric information costs. Profitable firms generate 
higher levels of retained earnings and will therefore be less dependent on external financing 
sources. Within the information asymmetry framework, profitability is expected to be 
negatively related to leverage. Empirical evidence in existing literature tends to favour the 
predictions of the pecking order theory over the trade-off theory (e.g. Rajan & Zingales, 1995; 
Frank & Goyal, 2009). The variable profitability is therefore included in the model in order to 
extract additional explanatory power and is defined as the ratio of earnings before taxes and 
depreciation divided by the book value of total assets. 
 
(iii) Growth opportunity: As an approximation for growth opportunities I use the market-to-
book value ratio. Firms that have a high market valuation relative to the book value are 
presumed to hold a strong growth potential (Alves et al., 2015). However, the view about the 
implications of future growth on the capital structure of a firm differ strongly among 
researchers. Again, I can make a distinction between the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory. According to the former, growth is expected to increase the likelihood of bankruptcy 
and is related to higher financial distress costs. In addition, firms need to make investments in 
order to grow, which has a diminishing effect on net profits. Ergo, tax shield benefits will be 
less pronounced and total leverage should be reduced. The latter argues that since growth firms 
need to make substantial investments, external capital will be needed. Under the plausible 
assumption that internal capital will not suffice the capital that is demand, external funding 
needs to be raised. As explicitly proposed by the pecking order theory, debt should be preferred 
over equity. Consistent with this view, a positive relationship between growth opportunities and 
leverage is expected. Regarding the measurement of growth opportunities, several metrics can 
be used. However, as documented by Frank & Goyal (2009), the market-to-book value is the 
most reliable measure and will therefore be used in the present study. 
 
(iv) Firm size: Firm size has been a perennial subject in capital structure literature and has been 
strongly related to financial decision-making (e.g. Titman & Wessels, 1988; Baker & Wurgler, 
2002). According to the trade-off theory, large firms tend to face relatively lower costs in case 
of financial distress and are generally more diversified than smaller firms. As a result, larger 
firms issue more debt than smaller firms and are generally more levered. With respect to the 
pecking order theory I expect to find a different result. Larger firms tend to have lower 
information asymmetry problems since they are subject to strong reporting requirements, are 
typically for a longer period in the market and better monitored by financial analysts. As a result 
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of lower information asymmetry costs, firms will have better access to equity capital markets 
and will therefore issue an increasing amount of equity over debt as firm size increases. 
Empirically, most studies report results that are in line with the trade-off argument where 
leverage is positively related to firm size (e.g. Frank & Goyal, 2009; Alves et al., 2015). In this 
study, firm size is measured by the total assets as reported by the firm. For a complete overview 
of all variables used in this study, please refer to Table A.I, presented in the Appendix. 
 
3.5. Methodology    
In order to capture the relationship between the composition of the board and the capital 
structure choice of a firm, I will set up a linear regression model that follows the work of Alves 
et al. (2015). I employ a cross-sectional time series model on the following baseline regression: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1 (% 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1     (2) 
+ 𝛽2 (𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽3 (𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽4 (𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑖𝑥)𝑖,𝑡−1   
+ 𝛽5 (𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛽6 (𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑢 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1   
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐽 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1  +  ε     
    
Where 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 takes the form of one of the previously defined dependent variables. 
The index 𝑖 denotes an individual firm, 𝛼0 is a constant, t = 1, ..., T identifies the time dimension 
and where  ε  denotes a mean zero error, or residual term. An overview of the variables 𝛽1  to 
𝛽6 as well as the control variables can be found in Table A.I, presented in the Appendix. Lagged 
variables are used in the equation to mitigate problems of endogeneity. Following Getzman et 
al. (2014) and Amaro de Matos & Mergulhão (2018), it is presumed that the decisions made by 
board members need time to get executed, resulting in a lagged relation between corporate 
decision-making and the capital structure. In particular, the use of lagged explanatory variables 
account for dynamic endogeneity problems which would arise if the current capital structure 
depends on past changes in the composition of the board (Schultz et al., 2010).  
 
Regarding the testing procedure, I will estimate the baseline panel data model with industry-
fixed effects and year-fixed effects to circumvent potential problems of dependency in the 
residuals. In particular, the use of fixed-effects could eliminate unobserved heterogeneity if the 
effect of the unobserved characteristics is time-invariant (Petersen, 2009). The motivation to 
include industry-fixed effects instead of firm-fixed effects is twofold. First, existing empirical 
studies tend to favour industry-fixed effects over firm-fixed effects (Frank & Goyal, 2009; John 
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& Litov, 2010). Secondly, the inclusion of firm-fixed effects requires significant variation in 
the explanatory variable across time. However, given the nature of our independent variables 
(e.g. CEO gender, board size, CEO duality), it is expected to find only limited variation. 
Therefore, using firm-fixed effects on variables that are nearly time invariant can lead to 
imprecise estimates. To test the validity of the use of a fixed-effect model compared to a 
random-effect model, I test the correlation between the unobservable heterogeneity in the error 
term and the independent variables by using the Hausman test (1978). The Hausman test tests 
whether a fixed effects or random effects model is more appropriate. The null hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
 
H0: The fixed effect is not correlated with other independent variables. 
 
If H0 is rejected, fixed effects must be incorporated in the model, random effects otherwise. I 
will test for multicollinearity by estimating the correlation coefficients between all variables 
and will compute the variance inflation factors in case of uncertainty. Large correlation 
coefficients between any pair of independent variables suggest that the model includes variables 
that are correlated to both the dependent variable and to each other and should therefore be 
excluded (Joshi, 2012). Moreover, the baseline model (2) will rely on robust standard errors 
clustered at firm-level. This follows the approach of Getzman et al. (2014) and Faccio et al. 
(2016) and accounts for possible autocorrelation and/ or heteroskedasticity in the error terms, a 
common problem in panel data regressions. In particular, the lack of variance over time in the 
corporate governance related variables may lead to strong autocorrelation problems. Therefore, 
estimating the model with robust standard errors to correct for dependence in the error terms 
circumvents the problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms (Peterson, 
2009).   
 
In the baseline model (2), the presence of female directors is indirectly included by the Blau 
index for diversity and the dichotomous variable critical mass. However, in order to test for the 
direct relationship between the percentage of female directors in the board and the capital 
structure choice of a firm, I will augment the baseline regression as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1 (% 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1     (3) 
+ 𝛽2 (𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽3 (% 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽4 (𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑖𝑥)𝑖,𝑡−1   
+ 𝛽5 (𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1   +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐽 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1  +  ε     
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As shown, model (3) and model (2) are to the utmost extent similar, except for the fact that the 
variables Blau diversity index and critical mass are excluded and replaced by the variable 
percentage of female directors. Adding the latter variable in the model while keeping the former 
two variables would lead to strong multicollinearity problems. Therefore, this study will 
repeatedly report the results of model (2) and model (3) separately.  
 
4. Results 
This section displays the estimation results for the cross-sectional time series regression and 
consists out of two parts. First, I will document the descriptive statistics and the correlation 
coefficients of the regression variables. Second, the results of the panel data analysis will be 
presented in order to determine the direct relation between the board composition and the capital 
structure as predicted by the pecking order theory.  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table I reports the descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in the cross-sectional time 
series regression. It shows a balanced panel dataset with both financial and board composition 
data for 504 unique firms gathered over the period from 2010 to 2017. Regarding panel A, all 
board composition variables have a maximum range between zero and one except for board 
size. On average, boards have a gender diversity level, as measured by the standardized Blau 
index7, of 0.594. To interpret this number correctly, it is important to recognize that when the 
presence of female directors in the boardroom is 50%, the Blau index returns a score of one. 
The percentage of female directors in the board is included in Table I and provides additional 
insight on the average gender diversity in the board. As documented, the mean percentage of 
women in the board is 20.2 percent. Regarding nationality mix, Table I documents a value of 
0.252. Again, this number must be interpreted with care since it is not a percentage value but a 
diversity measure that returns the value of one when the board is completely diversified. 
However, due to data limitations I am not able to give further descriptive information about, 
inter alia, the actual number of different nationalities within the boards.  
 
                                                 
7 Referred to as the Blau index hereafter. 
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To capture potential trends in the composition of the boards, I decomposed the descriptive 
statistics by year. The results are presented in Table A.II in the Appendix and show that certain 
board characteristics have changed significantly over time. Most notable is the linear increase 
in female representation over the period from 2010 to 2017. The percentage of female directors 
has increased from a mean value of 0.142 (14.2%) in 2010 to 0.266 (26.6%) in 2017. Clearly, 
the Blau Index for gender diversity has followed the same trend. The critical mass dummy, 
which equals 1 if more than 30% of the board members are female, increased remarkably from 
0.083 (8.3%) in 2010 to 0.386 (38.6%) in 2017. The variables board independence, CEO 
duality, board size, and nationality mix stayed nearly unchanged over the years.  
 
Presented in the Appendix, Table A.III shows the differences in the board composition between 
the American firms (reflected by the S&P 500) and the European firms (reflected by the Stoxx 
Euro 600). First, it becomes clear that CEO duality is more present within American firms than 
within European firms, with levels of 0.434 (43.4%) and 0.276 (27.6%) respectively. One 
explanation is that American corporate boards are characterized by having a one-tier structure 
while two-tier board structures are more common in Europe (Solomon, 2013). Since two-tier 
boards have a strict separation between the chairman and the CEO, it is cogent to find lower 
levels of CEO duality for European firms than for American firms. Second, the degree of 
nationality diversity is smaller for American firms (14.1%) than for European (37.1%) firms. 






Table I: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the board and firm-financial characteristics of 504 unique firms. 
All firms are listed and consistently present in either the S&P 500 or in the Stoxx Europe 600 during the period of 
2010 to 2017. The variables critical mass and CEO duality are dichotomous. For an extensive description of the 
variables used in this study, please refer to Table A.I in the Appendix.  
Variables Num. of Obs. Per year Avg. Mean Avg. Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Board composition  
    
Nationality mix 504 0.252 0.247 
Board size 504 11.8 3.9 
Critical mass (dummy) 504 0.207 0.405 
Blau diversity index 504 0.594 0.259 
% of female directors 504 0.202 0.112 
% of independent directors 504 0.734 0.160 
CEO duality (dummy) 504 0.358 0.479 
    
Panel B: Control variables       
    
Tangibility 504 0.264 0.223 
Firm size (log) 504 4.199 0.550 
Market-to-book ratio 504 1.382 1.285 
Profitability 504 0.138 0.076 
    
Panel C: Leverage       
    
Book values    
Retained earnings 504 0.273 0.495 
External equity 504 0.105 0.470 
Long-term liabilities 504 0.349 0.175 
Short-term liabilities 504 0.259 0.141 
Total liabilities 504 0.790 0.232 
    
Market values 
   
Retained earnings 504 0.259 0.366 
External equity 504 0.182 0.386 
Long-term liabilities 504 0.544 0.756 
Short-term liabilities 504 0.397 0.766 
Total liabilities 504 0.938 1.379 
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Although the percentage of female board members and the size of the board do not show any 
significant differences between the two subsamples, the critical mass dummy indicates that the 
presence of female board members is way more diluted among firms listed in the S&P 500 than 
in the Stoxx Euro 600, with mean values of 0.124 (12.4%) and 0.297 (29.7%) respectively. As 
prior literature stresses the importance of having a substantial number of female directors in the 
board for decision effectiveness and transparency (e.g. Joecks et al., 2012), the observed 
relation between the presence of female board members and capital structure may differ 
between the subsamples.  
 
Table II provides the correlation coefficients between all variables. As reported in Table II, 
many explanatory variables are significantly correlated with each other at the 1% significance 
level. However, the magnitudes of these correlations are predominantly small, except for the 
variables that are related to gender such as critical mass, percentage of female directors and the 
Blau diversity index. To test for potential multicollinearity in the model, the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) are computed and reported in Table A.IV in the Appendix. As shown, the VIFs 
are below the commonly used cut-off value of 2 and do not indicate the presence of 
multicollinearity (Getzman et al., 2014).  
4.2 Research results  
The tables in this section will persistently display the results of the baseline model (2) and the 
augmented baseline model (3), regressed on various dependent variables. Hausman tests are 
performed on all regressions in order to test whether fixed- or random-effects are more 
appropriate in the model. To interpret the results of the estimation coefficients of the board 
composition variables, it must be recognized that we are dealing with a log-level regression 
model and that all dependent variables are scaled to the book value of total assets. Special care 
has to be taken for the dichotomous variables since the interpretation to the dependent variable 
is asymmetric and depends on whether the dummy equals to the value of one or zero. In this 
study I will only refer to the situation in which the dummy turns from zero to one and not vice 
versa. Finally, as previously mentioned, the explanatory variables in the model are lagged by 
one year and the observed effects must therefore be interpreted accordingly. This structure and 











Table II: Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the (Pearson) correlation matrix of the data sample which consists out of 504 unique firms with observations over the period from 2010 to 
2017. The numerical indicators (1) to (12) are defined as: (1) nationality mix, (2) board size, (3) critical mass, (4) Blau index, (5) % of independent directors, 
(6) CEO duality, (7) leverage, (8) tangibility, (9) firm size, (10) market-to-book ratio, (11) profitability, (12) % of female directors. The variable leverage (7) is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities and book value of capital. Subscript * corresponds to statistical significance at the 0.01 significance level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
            
 
(1) 1 
          
 
(2) 0.0601* 1 
         
 
(3) 0.0958* -0.0225 1 
        
 
(4) 0.0574* 0.0331 0.7027* 1 
       
 
(5) -0.0458* -0.1386* 0.0409* 0.0212 1 
      
 
(6) -0.1404* 0.1762* 0.0076 0.0161 -0.0477* 1 
     
 
(7) 0.3544* 0.0171 0.2005* 0.1523* -0.0239 -0.1268* 1 
    
 
(8) -0.1076* 0.0693* -0.0274 -0.0108 0.0256 0.1055* -0.0018 1 
   
 
(9) 0.0338 0.3798* 0.1115* 0.1989* -0.0479* 0.0846* -0.1461* 0.1766* 1 
  
 
(10) -0.0696* -0.3258* -0.0410* 0.0220 -0.0241 -0.0583* -0.1800* -0.2543* -0.3885* 1 
 
 
(11) -0.1316* -0.2280* -0.0620* -0.0439* -0.0464* -0.0137 -0.1518* 0.0354 -0.2763* 0.6698* 1  
(12) 0.0561* 0.0346 0.7025* 0.9996* 0.0214 0.0183 -0.0107 0.2002* 0.0233 0.1488* -0.0433* 1 
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4.2.1 Results for leverage 
In this subsection, I examine the relation between board composition and leverage.  The results 
are reported in Table III. In column (1), it is documented that nationality diversity and gender 
diversity (Blau index) are both negatively related to leverage. To be specific, a 10% increase 
in nationality diversity (gender diversity) will lead to a 0.57% (0.32%) decrease in total 
leverage. With respect to the extent of female directors in the board, the results in column (2) 
show that a 10% increase in the percentage of female directors is associated with a 1.37% 
decrease in total leverage and is statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level.  
 
With respect to the variables board size, board independence and CEO duality, I find a positive 
relationship to leverage. Most economically relevant is the coefficient of the percentage 
of independent directors, which indicates that a 10% increase in independent directors is 
associated with a 0.83% increase in total leverage, which is consistent with the results of Alves 
et al. (2015). However, in order to give a robust interpretation of the estimation results regarding 
the board composition variables, one must recognize that the dependent variables in Table III 
do not allow us to make a distinction between the different financing sources that are used in 
the capital structure and only distinguishes total equity from total liabilities. Ergo, based on 
Table III I am not able to relate the results to information asymmetry arguments and can 
therefore not state whether the explanatory variables have an impact on the level of information 
asymmetry within the firm. Following the pecking order theory, an increase in the use of 
external equity is an indication that information asymmetries have been diminished, while an 
increase in the use of retained earnings indicates the contrary. Since the total leverage ratio does 
not distinguish internal equity from external equity and long-term debt from short-term debt, 
more extensive insights will be provided in later results.  
 
Turning to the control variables, the coefficient estimates show strong statistical significance 
for the variables tangibility and market expectations. First, the results for tangibility are 
consistent with prior research and support the notion that asset tangibility leads to better 
investor protection and should therefore result in higher observed levels of leverage obtained 
by the firm. Regarding market expectations, I find a negative relation to leverage. This result 
supports the predictions of the trade-off theory but is inconsistent with the pecking order theory. 
Baker & Wurgler (2002) offer an alternative explanation for this result based on the market-
timing theory. The authors argue that firms tend to issue equity when the market capitalization  
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of the firm is considered to be overvalued and will repurchase equity from the market 
otherwise. Assuming that a high book-to-market ratio is an indicator for a relatively high 
market capitalization, the negative coefficient can be the result of an increase in external equity 
issues.  
 
With respect to profitability, I find that an increase in profitability is positively associated with 
an increase in leverage. This result is in line with trade-off theory and supports the conviction 
that profitable firms can benefit more from tax shields than unprofitable firms and should 
therefore use more debt. As such, there will be more room for leverage if the operational 
profitability increases. The estimation coefficients for firm size do not return statistical 
Table III: Panel data regression results of leverage (book values) 
This table presents the industry-and year-fixed effects panel data regression results, using the sample set consisting 
out of 504 unique firms during the period of 2010 to 2017. Regression (1) shows the baseline regression results 
with total leverage, defined as the book value of total liabilities divided by total assets, as dependent variable. Model 
(2) shows the regression results of the augmented baseline regression where the variables Blau diversity index and 
critical mass are replaced for the variable percentage of female directors. The independent variables have a one 
period lag on the dependent variable and all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for skewness 
in the data and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman tests are performed to determine whether firm-fixed 
effects are preferred over random effects. All Hausman tests yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-
effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with 
robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficients.  
 (1) (2) 
Explanatory variables Leverage Leverage 
Nationality mix -0.0570** -0.0577** 
 (0.0295) (0.0274) 
Board size 0.00407** 0.00403** 
 (0.0262) (0.0277) 
% of female directors  -0.137*** 
  (0.001) 
Blau diversity index -0.0320*  
 (0.0713)  
Critical mass  -0.0155*  
 (0.0985)  
CEO duality  0.0118** 0.0115** 
 (0.0664) (0.0754) 
% of independent directors 0.0829** 0.0837** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Tangibility  0.228*** 0.228*** 
 (9.11e-05) (9.11e-05) 
Firm size  0.0170 0.0180 
 (0.387) (0.360) 
Market expectations  -0.0193*** -0.0192*** 
 (1.22e-05) (1.39e-05) 
Profitability  0.01431* 0.01432* 
 (0.091) (0.091) 
Constant -0.649*** -0.649*** 
 (5.57e-08) (5.41e-08) 
   
R-Squared 0.2076 0.2068 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
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significance. In the next paragraph, I attempt to gain a deeper insight into the impact of the 
board composition on the capital structure by segregating total leverage into four different 
financing sources. For a further description of these financing sources please refer to Table A.I 
in the Appendix. 
4.2.2 Research results per financing source 
Table IV presents the regression results with each of the four financing sources separately 
considered as independent variable. Columns (1) to (4) show the regression results of the 
baseline model (2) while columns (5) to (8) show the regression results of the augmented 
baseline model (3). The results show that nationality diversity is negatively related to long-term 
debt at the 10% significance level, the regressions on the other specifications do not return 
statistical significance. Combining this result with the results in Table III, the negative relation 
to leverage could be explained by a lower use of long-term debt. As such, the observed lower 
level of leverage is likely not the result of an increase in external equity but rather the result of 
a decrease in long-term debt.  
 
The effect of board size returns statistical significance for the specifications retained earnings 
and long-term debt. In particular, a one unit increase in board size is associated with a 0.16% 
(0.11%) decrease (increase) in retained earnings (long-term debt). The shift from internal equity 
to long-term debt is consistent with the view of Coles et al. (2008) and suggests that board size 
positively influences the quality of the board and in turn mitigates information asymmetry 
problems.  
 
With respect to gender diversity, I find in column (1) that a 10% increase in gender diversity is 
associated with a 1.4% increase in retained earnings. Again, in combination with the previous 
results on leverage, it becomes apparent that the negative relation between gender diversity and 
leverage is the result of the positive relation between gender diversity and retained earnings. 
This outcome contradicts with the prediction that gender diversity on the board leads to the use 
of more risky securities in the capital structure (H2a). One possible justification is that as 
women are less likely to engage in risky behaviour than men (Eckel and Grossmann, 2008), 





Table IV: Panel data regression results of capital structure (book values) 
This table presents the industry-and year-fixed effects panel data regression results, using the sample consisting out of 504 unique firms during the period of 2010 to 2017. In columns 
(1) to (4) the baseline regression is performed on four different leverage ratios. In particular, the scaled book values of retained earnings, external equity, long-term debt and short-
term debt are used as independent variables respectively. Columns (5) to (8) present the results of the augmented baseline model where the variables Blau diversity index and critical 
mass are replaced for the variable percentage of female directors. The independent variables have a one period lag on the dependent variable and all financial variables are logarithmized 
in order to account for skewness in the data and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman tests are performed to determine whether fixed effects are preferred over random 
effects. All Hausman tests yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are 
adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficients. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables RE EE LTD STD RE EE LTD STD 
Nationality mix 0.001 -0.150 -0.101* -0.0175 -0.00756 -0.142 -0.101* -0.0182 
 (0.992) (0.244) (0.0617) (0.655) (0.937) (0.269) (0.0600) (0.641) 
Board size -0.0162** -0.00342 0.0109*** 0.0007 -0.0152** -0.00363 0.0109*** 0.0007 
 (0.0174) (0.698) (0.00379) (0.808) (0.0255) (0.680) (0.00384) (0.792) 
% of female directors     0.184 0.199 -0.134 0.0388 
     (0.228) (0.311) (0.108) (0.508) 
Blau diversity index 0.135** -0.00605 -0.0351 0.0286     
 (0.0462) (0.946) (0.349) (0.278)     
Critical mass  -0.0673* 0.0805* -0.0176 -0.00125     
 (0.0641) (0.0935) (0.378) (0.929)     
% of independent directors -0.0917 0.184 0.0237 0.0857* -0.104 0.195 0.0236 0.0859* 
 (0.463) (0.280) (0.733) (0.0856) (0.406) (0.253) (0.734) (0.0849) 
CEO duality  -0.0630** 0.0581 -0.00640 0.00889 -0.0630** 0.0566 -0.006 0.0091 
 (0.0496) (0.194) (0.720) (0.480) (0.0497) (0.206) (0.724) (0.471) 
Tangibility  -0.524** 0.322 0.602*** -0.139 -0.512** 0.309 0.602*** -0.138 
 (0.0115) (0.234) (2.12e-07) (0.111) (0.0136) (0.254) (2.13e-07) (0.113) 
Firm size  0.147** -0.221** 0.211*** -0.142*** 0.146** -0.223** 0.212*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0155) (4.02e-08) (1.43e-06) (0.0342) (0.0145) (3.62e-08) (1.52e-06) 
Market expectations  0.0776*** -0.00690 -0.0434*** -0.00416 0.0766*** -0.10729** -0.0432*** -0.00427 
 (1.12e-05) (0.758) (2.68e-06) (0.528) (1.45e-05) (0.018) (2.97e-06) (0.516) 
Profitability 1.809*** -1.472*** -0.162 0.193** 1.805*** -1.461*** -0.163 0.191** 
 (0) (3.98e-09) (0.136) (0.0117) (0) (5.05e-09) (0.134) (0.0124) 
Constant -2.246*** -1.217** -2.335*** -0.739*** -2.222*** -1.231** -2.337*** -0.734*** 
 (1.13e-08) (0.0233) (0) (4.14e-05) (1.68e-08) (0.0217) (0) (4.68e-05) 
R-Squared 0.2654 0.1702 0.3268 0.2960 0.2617 0.1697 0.3265 0.2954 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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To test the relevance of this argument, I must control whether an increase in the level of female 
directors is positively related to an increase in gender diversity, which is strictly the case if 
women are under-represented in the boardroom. The correlation coefficient, as reported in 
Table II, provides evidence that gender diversity and female directors are indeed highly and 
positively correlated.  
 
With regard to the percentage of independent directors on the board, I find no strong results 
since only the coefficient for the regression on short-term debt is statistically significant. As 
documented in column (4), a 10% increase in the fraction of independent directors is associated 
with a 0.86% increase in short-term debt. Although only significant at the 10% significance 
level, this result provides some evidence for the hypothesis (H1a) that boards with more 
independent directors hold the potential to decrease the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and capital providers and promote the use of external financing sources. 
However, further tests are needed to control whether the observed increase in short-term debt 
is positively or negatively related to the use of external capital as compared to internal capital. 
 
With respect to the dichotomous variable critical mass, the results in column (1) show a negative 
relation to retained earnings and a positive relation to external equity. Following the pecking 
order theory, retained earnings is the first order consideration of capital while external equity 
is the last. A shift from the use of retained earnings to external equity is a clear signal that 
information asymmetries have been reduced and subsequently, the costs of external financing.  
 
In the presence of CEO duality, it is expected that boards are less independent and consequently 
less effective. Surprisingly, the results in Table IV show that CEO duality is negatively related 
to internal capital. In comparing the results for CEO duality in Table III with Table IV, I find 
that the positive relation between CEO duality and leverage can be partly explained by the 
negative effects on retained earnings. As such, the results stir up the suggestion that CEO 
duality leads to lower information asymmetry problems.  
 
Turning to the control variables, asset tangibility is negatively related to retained earnings and 
positively related to long-term debt. Following the pecking order theory, one can argue that 
tangibility decreases the level of information asymmetry between the firm the and capital 
investors and causes the firm to use more external financing sources. With respect to market 
expectations, I find no supporting evidence for the pecking order theory. However, the signs of 
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the coefficient estimate in column (1) and (3) support the predictions of the trade-off theory and 
show that a high market-to-book ratio is positively related to retained earnings and negative 
related to long-term debt. To be more specific, since growth firms are expected to benefit less 
from tax shields in the coming years, debt issuance should be limited. 
 
Lastly, the effect of firm size is not clear since the results do not show a consistent shift from 
or towards the use of external capital. As documented, firm size is positively related to retained 
earnings, negatively to external equity, positive to long-term debt, and negative to short-term 
debt. Table V provides further insights in the relative use of the four financing sources in a 
firm’s capital structure. 
4.2.3 Research results for the relative use per financing source 
Table V provides evidence as to whether the capital structure is composed out of more long-
term debt or external equity; more long-term debt or short-term debt; more short-term debt or 
retained earnings; and lastly, more total liabilities or external equity. In column (3) I find that 
firms with larger boards appear to use more short-term debt as compared to retained earnings. 
This supports the prediction that firms with a greater board size use more risky financing 
sources in the capital structure (H4a). This result is in line with Coles et al. (2008) and may 
suggest that the size of the board has a positive effect on the monitoring capabilities, and thus, 
improves board efficiency. 
 
Regarding board diversity (both gender and nationality), I am not able to find statistical 
significance in any of the respective coefficient estimates and I am therefore not able to support 
the predictions made in hypothesis H2a and H3a based on Table V. Notwithstanding the fact 
that I have found statistically significant results on the relation between board diversity and 
total leverage in Table III, further research is needed to provide better insights concerning the 
relation between board diversity and the financing mix used by a firm. 
 
However, by using an alternative measure for gender diversity, namely the percentage of female 
directors, I find a negative relation to the use of total debt as compared to external equity. In 
particular, a 10% increase in the percentage of female board directors is associated with a 1.26% 
decrease in the use of debt as compared to total external capital. This finding supports 
hypothesis (H2b) and is consistent with the notion of Alves et al. (2015) that firms with a higher 
percentage of females in the board face lower levels of information asymmetry, and thus, have 
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better access to external equity. In addition, the coefficient estimates for the critical mass 
variable indicate that firms with at least 30% of female directors in the board hold less long-
term debt as compared to external equity; hold more short-term debt as compared to retained 
earnings; and hold less total debt as compared to external equity. In particular, if the 
dichotomous variable turns to the value of one, the ratio between the use of total debt and the 
use of external capital decreases by 4.4% (𝑒(−0.045) − 1).  
 
In Column (3) I find that the fraction of independent directors is positively associated to the use 
of short-term debt over retained earnings. Specifically, a 10% increase in the percentage of 
independent directors is associated with a 1.70% increase in the ratio between short-term debt 
and the sum of retained earnings and short-term debt. This supports the hypothesis (H1a) that 
board independence is positively related to the use of more risky financing sources.  Finally, in 
contradiction to hypothesis 5a, column (4) provides evidence (at the 0.1 significance level) that 
in the presence of CEO duality, firms are more likely to use external equity as compared to debt 
financing. If the dichotomous variable turns to the value of one, the ratio between the use of 
total debt and the use of external capital decreases by 2.66% (𝑒(−0.027) − 1).  
 
Turning to the control variables, market expectations appear to be inversely related to external 
capital. As documented in column (3), market expectations are negatively related to short-term 
debt as compared to retained earnings. Moreover, the results in column (2) and (4) indicate that 
firms with a high market-to-book value use less long-term debt as compared to short-term debt 
and use less external equity as compared to debt. These results are in line with the findings of 
Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Titman & Wessels (1988) and show supporting evidence for the 
pecking order theory. Regarding tangibility, the coefficient estimates partially support the 
prediction that firms with a high level of tangible assets face less information asymmetry with 
their creditors, and thus, are able to use more external capital. In particular, I columns (2) and 
(3) I find evidence that tangibility is positively related to the use of long-term debt over short-
term debt and to the use of short-term debt over retained earnings. However, inconsistent with 
the predictions, column (1) and (4) show that tangibility is inversely related to the use of 
external equity as compared to debt.
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Table V: Panel data regression results of financing mix  
This table presents the industry-and year- fixed effects panel data regression results, using the sample consisting out of 504 unique firms during the period of 2010 to 2017. In columns (1) to (4) 
the dependent variables are defined as follows: (1) long-term debt over the sum of external equity and long-term debt, (2) long-term debt over total debt, (3) short-term debt over the sum of retained 
earnings and short-term debt, (4) total debt over the sum of external equity and total liabilities. All dependent variables are based on book values of capital. Columns (5) to (8) show the results of 
the augmented baseline model where the variables Blau diversity index and critical mass are replaced for the variable percentage of female directors. The independent variables have a one period 
lag on the dependent variable and all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for skewness in the data and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman tests are performed to 
determine whether fixed effects are preferred over random effects. All Hausman tests yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables LTD/(EE+LTD) LTD/TD STD/(RE+STD) TD/(EE+TD) LTD/(EE+LTD) LTD/TD STD/(RE+STD) TD/(EE+TD) 
Nationality mix -0.0180 -0.0558 -0.0107 -0.0197 -0.0229 -0.0557 -0.00766 -0.0232 
 (0.788) (0.173) (0.829) (0.661) (0.731) (0.174) (0.877) (0.605) 
Board size 0.00307 0.00461 0.00684** 0.00339 0.00342 0.00465 0.00649** 0.00363 
 (0.506) (0.105) (0.0475) (0.277) (0.459) (0.103) (0.0460) (0.245) 
% of female directors     -0.114 0.00393 -0.0263 -0.126* 
     (0.268) (0.950) (0.727) (0.0663) 
Critical mass  -0.0617** -0.00130 0.0311* -0.0450***     
 (0.0131) (0.932) (0.0844) (0.00620)     
Blau diversity index 0.0380 -0.00442 -0.0396 0.00741     
 (0.415) (0.877) (0.242) (0.811)     
% of independent directors -0.0967 -0.0445 0.170*** -0.000622 -0.101 -0.0454 0.175*** -0.00321 
 (0.263) (0.399) (0.00724) (0.991) (0.242) (0.389) (0.00576) (0.956) 
CEO duality  -0.0304 0.00290 -0.00156 -0.0271* -0.0295 0.00273 -0.00144 -0.0265* 
 (0.177) (0.830) (0.923) (0.0682) (0.191) (0.840) (0.929) (0.0741) 
Tangibility 0.105*** 0.0982*** 0.0981*** 0.0631*** 0.107*** 0.0981*** 0.0972*** 0.0642*** 
 (5.22e-05) (9.04e-10) (4.20e-07) (0.000348) (4.04e-05) (9.24e-10) (5.41e-07) (0.000278) 
Market expectations 0.00773 -0.0619*** -0.121*** 0.0428*** 0.00773 -0.0620*** -0.120*** 0.0429*** 
 (0.741) (1.28e-05) (0) (0.00583) (0.741) (1.24e-05) (0) (0.00579) 
Profitability 0.113*** 0.0121 -0.0792*** 0.0448*** 0.112*** 0.0122 -0.0789*** 0.0441*** 
 (5.27e-07) (0.380) (2.05e-06) (0.00266) (6.67e-07) (0.376) (2.22e-06) (0.00309) 
Firm size 0.211*** 0.198*** -0.161*** 0.0837** 0.214*** 0.197*** -0.162*** 0.0856*** 
 (8.60e-06) (0) (9.52e-06) (0.0105) (6.44e-06) (0) (8.44e-06) (0.00900) 
Constant -0.749*** -1.435*** -0.225 -0.365* -0.738*** -1.436*** -0.231 -0.358* 
 (0.00479) (0) (0.274) (0.0509) (0.00555) (0) (0.261) (0.0563) 
R-squared 0.2001 0.3216 0.2303 0.1245 0.1978 0.3212 0.2272 0.1216 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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A possible explanation arises from the high negative correlation between tangibility and the 
market-to-book value. See Table II. Following the market-timing theory, it can be argued that 
when tangibility is high, the market-to-book value is relatively low, which makes it unattractive 
for firms to issue equity. As such, I find that when information asymmetry problems are 
reduced, firms rely more on external capital but prefer long-term debt over external equity.  
 
With respect to profitability, I find some contradicting results. The traditional capital structure 
theory of Modigliani & Miller (1963) propagates that profitability should be positively related 
to leverage since it allows for the capitalization of tax shields. In line with this argument, 
columns (1) and (4) show that profitable firms indeed use more debt as compared to external 
equity. However, I find contradicting results in column (3) that shows that retained earnings are 
preferred over short-term debt. Nevertheless, one finds a clear explanation for this if we turn 
ourselves to the pecking order theory. As such, profitable firms generate more internal capital 
than unprofitable firms and are therefore more likely to use this capital before they turn to the 
capital markets.  
 
Finally, the effect of firm size on capital structure choice is debatable. In particular, in columns 
(1) to (4) it is found that larger firms use more long-term debt than external equity; more long-
term debt than short-term debt; and more retained earnings then short-term debt. With respect 
to the pecking order theory, I find here one area of conflict. In particular, given that the proposed 
financing order is respected, short-term debt should be preferred over long-term debt since it is 
less risky and comes with lower information asymmetry costs. However, this conflict could be 
explained with the trade-off theory. As such, assuming that large firms have a lower likelihood 
to get into financial distress and have relatively low costs of bankruptcy (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995), firms can decide to take on more risk in the capital structure in order to benefit from the 
interest tax shield.  
5. Robustness 
Hitherto, the results support the notion that the composition of the board has a significant 
influence on the capital structure choice of a firm. In this section I will perform several 
alternative tests to check for robustness in the results.  
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5.1 Robustness for market values 
So far, I have performed all regressions on the book values of leverage. Nevertheless, in line 
with Titman & Wessels (1988) and Gilson (1997), I will use a second measure of leverage that 
is based on the market value of common equity to cross-validate the previous results. This 
implies that external equity will be calculated as the market capitalization of total equity at the 
end of year 𝑡 minus the book value of retained earnings at the end of year 𝑡. The results on 
financial leverage are presented in Table VI. The observant reader will notice that the market 
value-based models have a stronger explanatory power, rested on the R-squared measure (0.77), 
than the book value-based models (R-squared of 0.20). However, in terms of statistical 
significance the market value-based model returns very weak results. One possible justification 
for this is that due to data limitations I used the book values of debt whilst the market values of 
equity are used. This implies that possible fluctuations in the perceived riskiness of the firm by 
investors are not reflected in the values of debt but are only reflected in the values of equity. As 
a result, the leverage ratio can be strongly biased since the denominator will be subject to strong 
autocorrelation while the value of the numerator changes constantly. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient estimates for all the four control variables show the same signs as in Table III, 
supporting the previous findings regarding the effects of tangibility, firm size, market 
expectations and profitability on financial leverage. Moreover, regressions are performed on 
the market values of the four different financing sources. The results are reported in Table A.V, 
presented in the Appendix. In general, the findings appear to be similar to the results on book 
values and support my previous findings.  
5.2 Cross-sectional results 
Since the data in this study is not stationary8, I will analyse the results in a cross-sectional setting 
for the years 2011 to 2017. The use of a cross-sectional regression excludes by definition the 
yearly-fixed effects from the model and loses the observations for the year 2010 as I use lagged 
values. However, to stay consistent with the previous models, industry-fixed effects are still 
included and validated with the Hausman test. The results are presented in Table A.VI. 
                                                 
8 Given the nature of the explanatory variables, the statistical properties are unlikely to be constant over time. 
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Regarding the variables gender diversity, CEO duality, firm size and market expectations I find 
consistent results over time. In particular, all statistically significant coefficient estimates show 
consistent signs over the years but are, however, in some cases in contradiction with our 
previous results. For example, in Table III there is no significant relationship reported between 
firm size and financial leverage. However, as shown in Table A.VI, there exists a negative and 
statistically significant relation between firm size and financial leverage for nearly all years. As 
aforementioned, the effect of firm size on the capital structure choice of a firm has been highly 
debatable since I find both significant positive associations with the use of internal capital and 
long-term debt, but also negative associations with the use of short-term debt and external 
Table VI: Panel data regression results of leverage (market values) 
This table presents the industry-and year-fixed effects panel data regression results, using the sample set consisting out 
of 504 unique firms during the period of 2010 to 2017. Regression (1) shows the baseline regression results with total 
market leverage, defined as the book value of total liabilities divided by the market value of total assets, as dependent 
variable. Model (2) shows the regression results of the augmented baseline regression where the variables Blau 
diversity index and critical mass are replaced for the variable percentage of female directors. All dependent variables 
are based on market values of capital. The independent variables have a one period lag on the dependent variable and 
all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for skewness in the data and improve normality in the error 
terms. Hausman tests are performed to determine whether firm-fixed effects are preferred over random effects. All 
Hausman tests yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The 
p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficients. 
 (1) (2) 
Explanatory variables Leverage  Leverage 
   
Nationality mix 0.0111 0.0118 
 (0.741) (0.726) 
Board size 0.00600*** 0.00587** 
 (0.00985) (0.0115) 
% of female directors  -0.107* 
  (0.0557) 
Critical mass  -0.00109  
 (0.937)  
Blau index diversity -0.0398  
 (0.117)  
% of independent directors 0.00912 0.0108 
 (0.838) (0.809) 
CEO duality  -0.0114 -0.0113 
 (0.338) (0.343) 
Tangibility 0.0494*** 0.0491*** 
 (9.26e-05) (0.000101) 
Market expectations -0.445*** -0.444*** 
 (0) (0) 
Profitability 0.0233* 0.0235* 
 (0.0607) (0.0582) 
Firm size 0.110*** 0.111*** 
 (3.50e-07) (3.21e-07) 
Constant -1.420*** -1.424*** 
 (0) (0) 
   
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.7793 0.7692 
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equity. Moreover, as presented in Table III, the effect on financial leverage has turned out to be 
insignificant when the dataset is comprised of all years. It remains therefore uncertain what the 
exact effect of firm size is on the capital structure choice of a firm. However, since firm size 
does not play a central role in this study, I will leave this point open for further discussion.  
 
With respect to the board composition variables, the most emphatic results come from the 
variables CEO duality and gender diversity. Regarding the former, for the years till 2014 I find 
that CEO duality is positively related to the use of leverage. This result supports the previous 
findings and provides clear evidence that firms with a CEO that is also the chair use more 
leverage. With respect to gender diversity I find a positive relation to leverage in the years 2017, 
2012 and 2011, which is in contradiction to my previous results. To test whether this is the 
result of an increase in the use of equity or debt, I computed the association between gender 
diversity and equity for the respective three years. However, the results show no statistical 
significance and will therefore not be further discussed.9 
5.3 Separation of indices  
To test for potential differences between Europe and the U.S., I analysed the results in a panel 
data framework for each index separately. In this way I can check whether the implications of 
the board composition on capital structure differs per market. As aforementioned, the 
composition of the board differs between American and European firms, and in particular for 
the variables nationality mix, critical mass and CEO duality. To test whether these differences 
impact the association between the board composition and the capital structure of a firm, I 
regress the baseline model (2) and augmented model (3) for the two markets separately. The 
results are reported in Table VII.  In columns (1) and (3) the subsample for the American stock 
market is used and includes 262 unique firms over the period of 2010 to 2017. In Columns (2) 
and (3) the subsample for the European stock market is used and includes 242 unique firms 
over the period of 2010 to 2017. 
 
With respect to the board composition variables, I find in columns (1) and (2) that board size 
has a significant and positive impact on the use of leverage for European firms, but not for 
American firms. One possible explanation for this result is that there is not enough variation in 
the data for the U.S. to be able to determine the relation between the use of leverage and the 
                                                 
9  The regression results are available on request by the author. 
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Table VII:  Panel data regression results of leverage decomposed by index 
This table presents the industry-and year-fixed effects panel data regression results. In columns (1) and (3) a subsample that represents the American stock market is used and includes 262 
unique firms over the period of 2010 to 2017. In Columns (2) and (3) subsample that represents the European stock market is used and includes 242 unique firms over the period of 2010 
to 2017. The dependent variable is computed as the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets.  The independent variables have a one period lag on the dependent 
variable and all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for skewness in the data and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman tests are performed to determine 
whether fixed effects are preferred over random effects. All Hausman tests yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables U.S. EU U.S. EU 
     
Nationality mix 0.00546 -0.0111 0.00375 -0.0108 
 (0.903) (0.717) (0.933) (0.723) 
Board size -0.00108 0.00633*** -0.000709 0.00637*** 
 (0.713) (0.00297) (0.808) (0.00283) 
% of female directors   -0.0211 0.0792 
   (0.753) (0.104) 
Critical mass  -0.0188 0.0134   
 (0.217) (0.238)   
Blau index diversity 0.0167 0.0167   
 (0.547) (0.451)   
% of independent directors 0.0999** 0.0899** 0.0995** 0.0905** 
 (0.0384) (0.0353) (0.0391) (0.0342) 
CEO duality  0.000268 -0.00103 0.000131 -0.00152 
 (0.979) (0.940) (0.990) (0.912) 
Tangibility 0.0387** 0.0903*** 0.0393** 0.0906*** 
 (0.0267) (0) (0.0243) (0) 
Market expectations -0.0818*** -0.0483*** -0.0815*** -0.0482*** 
 (9.99e-10) (4.15e-05) (1.15e-09) (4.28e-05) 
Profitability 0.0319*** -0.0123 0.0314*** -0.0122 
 (0.00223) (0.382) (0.00260) (0.386) 
Firm size -0.00482 -0.00367 -0.00375 -0.00452 
 (0.877) (0.875) (0.904) (0.846) 
Constant -0.291 -0.526*** -0.288 -0.525*** 
 (0.109) (1.87e-05) (0.112) (2.02e-05) 
Number of Companies 262 242 262 242 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.2614 0.3830 0.2608 0.3824 
 43 
size of the board. If we refer back to the descriptive Table III, I find indeed that the standard 
deviation of board size is much lower for the S&P 500 (2.1) than for the Stoxx Euro 600 (5.1). 
For the variables percentage of independent directors and tangibility we find matching results 
between the U.S. and Europe and with the results on the total sample, which supports our 
previous findings.  
 
Furthermore, regressions are performed on the four different financing sources separately and 
reported in Table A.VI, presented in the Appendix. As in Table VII, the results show more 
statistical significance for Europe than for the U.S. Nevertheless, the overall results still provide 
robust evidence that the composition of the board has a strong impact on the capital structure 
of a firm. 
6. Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to further discuss the main results of this study and to relate the 
underlying theoretical argumentation of the proposed hypotheses with the reported observed 
outcomes. In addition, this section elaborates on the limitations of this study and offers a set of 
recommendations for future research. 
6.1 Main analysis 
The findings reveal that firms with more independent boards tend to issue more short-term debt 
as compared to retained earnings. This result supports the first hypothesis (H1a) which 
conjectures that independent board members effectively reduce the level of information 
asymmetry between managers and capital providers and therefore promote the use of more risky 
financing sources in a firm’s capital structure. This result is in line with Alves et al. (2015) who 
document that firms that have a more independent board use more external- than internal 
capital. Moreover, this result supports the notion of Brennan & McDermott (2014) that 
independent directors are better able to monitor the management team and significantly 
improve the effectiveness of the board by giving more objective advice and counsel. Despite 
the fact that inside directors can supply the board with valuable information about the day-to-
day activities and performance of the firm, the results suggest that independent directors tend 
to act better in the interests of the shareholders than inside directors.
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In addition, the results support hypothesis H4a which conjectures that board size is positively 
related to the use of more risky financing sources. However, this result must be interpreted with 
caution. As mentioned by Coles et al. (2008), the degree of complexity of a firm is 
determinative for the sign of association between board size and board effectiveness. Since the 
sample set that is used in this study consists predominantly out of large firms, which are likely 
to be more complex (Coles et al., 2008), it is plausible that the results are to some extent subject 
to selection bias.  
 
Turning to the implications of gender, the results show that gender diversity in the board is 
negatively related to leverage and positively related to retained earnings. At a minimum, this 
result suggests that firms with gender diverse boards are less inclined to take financial risk and 
are therefore more likely to rely on internal capital as compared to external capital. However, 
the positive relation to internal capital is in conflict with the hypothesis (H2a) that firms with a 
more gender diverse board rely more on risky financing sources. One possible justification 
arises from the nonlinear relation between gender diversity and board effectiveness as argued 
by Joecks et al. (2012). According to the authors, an increase in gender diversity at first has a 
negative economic impact to the firm and only after a certain threshold of gender diversity is 
reached, this impact turns positively. This line of thought is supported by Earley & Mosakowski 
(2000) who document that homogeneous and highly heterogeneous groups outperform 
moderately diverse groups. The descriptive statistics presented in Table I show indeed that the 
average level of gender diversity among the analysed firms is notably low.  
 
Since gender diversity is a function of the ratio between men and women in the board, I used a 
second gender related measure to capture the impact of female board presence on the firm’s 
capital structure. First of all, the results show that female directors have a significant negative 
impact on the leverage used by the firm. If we take a closer look at the relative use of debt 
versus external equity, I find that firms that have a higher percentage of female directors in the 
board prefer to issue equity as compared to debt. This result supports the hypothesis (H2b) that 
the presence of female directors in the board contribute to lower information asymmetry and 
consequently promote the use of more risky financing sources. In order to gain a deeper insight 
into the intuition behind this result, it is important to recognize that the association between 
gender and information asymmetry is not directly tested but is based on the findings in previous 
research. As such, Adams & Ferreira (2009) argue that female directors significantly improve 
the monitoring qualities of the board by tougher monitoring, better attendance records, and by 
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better alignment with the shareholders. Since this improves the functioning of the board, it is 
reasonable to argue that female directors contribute to lower information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. In a similar vein of Certo et al. (2001) and Petersen & Vredenburg 
(2009, the positive link between female board directors and the use of more risky financing 
sources could also be a result of market signalling. Previous research reveals that it may not be 
the qualities of the board members per se that lead to better corporate performance, but rather 
the message that is signalled to the market. Although unverified in the present study, the 
inclusion of more female board members could improve the reputation of the firm (Kaur & 
Singh, 2017), attract a different pool of investors, and facilitate access to capital markets.  
 
A third measure for gender diversity is used to test whether the magnitude of the relationship 
between female directors and the capital structure is linear or increases if at least 30% of the 
board members are female (critical mass), as predicted by Joecks et al. (2012). In this study I 
find that (1) critical mass is negatively related to the use of internal capital as compared to short-
term debt and (2) positively related to the use of external equity as compared to total debt. This 
result supports the critical mass theory and suggests that the presence of at least 30% of female 
directors in the board significantly increases boards’ effectiveness (Torchia et al., 2011; Joecks 
et al., 2012). To conclude, I find that when boards are getting more gender heterogeneous, firms 
tend to rely more on internal capital. However, an increase in the presence of female directors 
on itself, and especially under the condition that 30% of the board members are female, can 
potentially be associated with a decrease in agency problems. Within the framework of the 
pecking order theory, the use of more external equity is a clear signal that agency problems 
such as information asymmetry have been decreased. However, since I experience many 
limitations in the statistical significance of the results, it is ambiguous to make strong arguments 
as to whether the shift to more external equity is the mere result of an increase in risk-aversion 
or of a reduction in information asymmetry. 
 
With respect to nationality diversity, I find a negative relation to total leverage and long-term 
debt. The negative relation to long-term debt is in contradiction with the prediction that firm’s 
with nationality diverse boards use more risky financing sources (H3a). A possible justification 
for this result is that the differences in individual characteristics of the board members could 
lead to teams experiencing more conflicts, less cohesion and slower decision-making, which 
could affect their ability to overcome agency problems (Hambrick et al., 1998). The results are 
in conflict with Nielsen and Nielsen (2013), who argue that multinational teams engage more 
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in in-depth discussions, have are more problem-solving approach, and arrive at more creative 
solutions. However, the results must be interpreted with caution since I only find weak 
statistically significant results (0.1 significance level) and only for a limited number of 
specifications. As such, the negative relation to long-term debt does not in itself provide us with 
sufficient information about the extent to which information asymmetries are affected.  
 
With respect to CEO duality, I find some striking results. This study demonstrates that CEO 
duality is associated with the use of more leverage; less internal capital; and a preference for 
external equity as compared to total debt. From an agency perspective, CEOs may be tempted 
to pursue their self-interests at the expense of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, 
entrusting the CEO with the role of chairman of the board could jeopardize the board’s 
functions of monitoring and disciplining the CEO. As a result, in the presence of CEO duality 
one should expect the board to be less independent and consequently less effective in reducing 
information asymmetries.  However, the results suggest something different. In conflict with 
our prediction (H5a) and previous studies (e.g. Alves et al., 2015), CEO duality is positively 
related to the use of more risky financing sources, and in particular, to external equity. Since 
the use of more risky financing sources signals a reduction in information asymmetries, there 
appears to be a positive force that is related to CEO duality. One possible justification of this 
result is that the model is subject to endogeneity bias caused by an omitted variable that is 
strongly correlated to the variable CEO duality. For example, Fosberg (2004) finds that if the 
CEO holds a low level of equity ownership in the firm, more debt is used. Therefore, the 
positive relation between CEO duality and firm leverage can be explained if the CEOs who are 
also chairman hold low levels of equity in the firm. However, the data availability limits the 
present study to formally test this argument. The stewardship theory could provide us a second 
rationale for this outcome. From a stewardship perspective, a potential benefit of CEO duality 
could arise from the enhanced unity of command at the top, which promotes fast and decisive 
decision-making (Tang, 2017). As such, the results stir up the suggestion that the benefits 
arising from stronger authority outweigh the costs associated with the loss of independence. 
6.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
One of the main concerns of this study is that our research procedure is not robust to 
endogeneity. Although this study partly addresses endogeneity by using lagged independent 
variables and fixed-effects, it must be acknowledged that there are certainly more factors at 
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play that could lead to biased estimates. In short, endogeneity occurs when the error term is 
correlated with an explanatory variable in the model. In our research design, one potential 
source of endogeneity is related to the direction of causation between the financing sources and 
the board of directors’ composition. As such, there may be a problem of reverse causality when 
the capital structure of a firm actually affects the composition of the board instead of the other 
way around. For example, it can be argued that when firms get into financial distress, 
shareholders get more inclined to intervene in the decisions of the management and 
consequently may request for a restructuring of the board. In particular, given that highly 
levered firms are more sensitive to market conditions, changes in the board composition and 
capital restructuring may be simply caused by financial performance. In line with this thought, 
Bhagat & Black (1998) showed that poor performing firms tend to increase the number of 
independent directors in the board. Moreover, Adams & Ferreira (2009) argue that firms that 
are perceived to be more progressive tend to attract more female directors. Given this, the 
association between capital structure and level of female directors could be caused by an 
unobserved variable.  
 
Another point of concern in this study is the implicit assumption that decisions about the capital 
structure are exclusively induced by the directors on the board. Although it is within the 
fiduciary duties of the board to engage seriously with the management team to determine the 
appropriate capital structure, it is plausible to believe that certain choices are made on the 
discretion of the executive managers only. For example, even though the CFO10 is obligated to 
report to the CEO and the board of directors, it is likely that many financial decisions are 
predominantly influenced by the CFO’s control. As I have limited this study to the examination 
of the board members exclusively, certain relations may actually be caused by managers that 
are not examined. Moreover, external factors such as the costs of debt capital, market volatility, 
and macroeconomic policy measures are not included in the models but are often significantly 
related to capital structure choices (Mokhova & Zinecker, 2013). Although limitations in the 
data made it infeasible for this study to take external variables into account, I have tried to 
establish enough explanatory power by including a range of firm-specific variables such as 
profitability and tangibility. 
 
                                                 
10 Despite the chief executive officer (CFO) is not usually a member of the board of directors, this is not excluded. 
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Further, this study does not account for country-specific effects. Since the variation in our data 
is much higher for the European sample than for the American sample, the comprised results 
are hard to generalize. In particular, if the board composition characteristics vary highly across 
countries but not within countries, the observed results may actually be strongly influenced by 
country-specific factors such as whether board gender diversity is forced by gender quotas.  
 
Hence, future research could improve the results by controlling and accounting for more forms 
of endogeneity. One estimation procedure that is commonly recommended is the instrumental 
variable approach, which restricts the model to only capture the variation in the explanatory 
variables that is not correlated to the error term. The instrumental variable approach requires a 
set of instrumental variables (instruments) that have the property to be correlated with the 
explanatory variable(s) but uncorrelated with the error term. As such, when the right 
instruments are used, the researcher can uncover the causal effect of the composition of the 
board on the capital structure. However, it is hard to find valid instrumental variables since the 
instruments are often still to some extent related to the dependent variable or only weakly 
correlated to the explanatory variable(s) (Baker et al, 1995).  
 
Furthermore, in recent years several countries and states have implemented a (soft-law) gender 
quota in order to promote the presence of women on the board of directors. However, this 
practise could have large implications for the actual quality of the board since directors are 
possibly not always chosen on the basis of their competencies. As such, it would be fascinating 
to examine whether the relation between board composition and capital structure differs 
between firms that were forced to restructure the board composition and firms that had the 
freedom to compose the board at their discretion.   
 
7. Conclusion 
By using a unique panel dataset that captures a wide range of board-specific characteristics for 
504 firms over a period of 10 years, this study addresses how and the extent to which the 
composition of the board affects the capital structure choices made by a firm. In particular, the 
fraction of independent directors, the degree of gender- and nationality diversity, board size, 
and CEO duality have been analysed. This study conjectures that when the board of directors 
in composed in such a way that it effectively reduces information asymmetry problems between 
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managers and outside investors, a higher fraction of risky financing sources will be used in the 
capital structure. After controlling for a wide-range of variables that have proven to be reliable 
capital structure determinants, it is shown that firms that have a stronger presence of female on 
the board tend to issue more equity as compared to debt and are generally less levered. In 
particular, the results show that when the presence of female directors in the board is at least 
30%, firms (1) hold less internal capital as compared to short-term debt and (2) hold more 
external equity as compared to long-term debt. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that female directors increase the effectiveness of the board, contribute to lower information 
asymmetry, and consequently promote the use of more risky financing sources. However, this 
study reveals that when boards are getting more gender heterogeneous, firm tend to rely more 
on safer financing sources such as internal capital. Overall, the results contribute well to the 
fierce debate about how and whether the composition of corporate boards needs be reformed. 
At the very least, from an economic perspective, the empirical results call into question the 
one-size-fits-all rule-based reform proposals such as strict gender quotas. The question on 
whether boards should become more gender diverse on the grounds of ethical justification, 
however, goes beyond the scope of this study. In addition, the results also provide some 
evidence that firms that have a larger board, more independent directors, or CEO who also 
holds the position of the chairman, use more risky financing sources in the capital structure. 
The effect of nationality diversity on capital structure asks for further research, as the regression 
results in this study are predominantly not statistically different from zero. Overall, this study 
adds well to the growing body of the literature that examines the impact of board composition 
on firm’s capital structure and echoes the findings in previous studies that certain board 
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Morellec, E., Nikolov, B., & Schürho, N. (2012). American Finance Association Corporate 
Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics. The Journal of Finance, 67(3), 803–848. 
 
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital Structure. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 81-102. 
 
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187–221. 
 
Myers, S.C. (1984). The Corporate Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 34(3), 575–591. 
Nielsen, B.B. and Nielsen, S. (2013) Top management team nationality diversity and firm 
performance: A multilevel study. Strategic Management Journal, 34(3), 373-382.  
Petersen, H., & Vredenburg, H. (2009). Morals or Economics? Institutional Investor 
Preferences for Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal Of Business Ethics, 90(1), 1-14.  
 
Petersen, M. (2009). Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches. Review Of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480.  
Rajan, R., & Zingales, L. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data. The Journal Of Finance, 50(5), 1421.  
Rashid, A. (2015). Does risk affect capital structure adjustments? The Journal Of Risk Finance, 
17(1), 80-92. 
 
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., & Tacheva, S. (2007). Nationality and Gender Diversity on Swiss 
Corporate Boards. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 546-557.  
 55 
Schultz, E., Tan, D., & Walsh, K. (2010). Endogeneity and the corporate governance - 
performance relation. Australian Journal Of Management, 35(2), 145-163.  
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). The Limits of Arbitrage. The Journal Of Finance, 52(1), 35-
55. 
 
Shyam-Sunder, L., & Myers, S. C. (1999). Testing static trade-off against pecking order models 
of capital structure: A critical comment. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(3), 219–244. 
 
Solomon, J. (2013) Corporate governance and accountability: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Storvik, A., & Teigen, M. (2010). Women on board. The Norwegian experience. International 
Policy Analysis. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
 
Sultana, N. (2015). Audit Committee Characteristics and Accounting 
Conservatism. International Journal of Auditing,19(2), 88-102.  
 
Taggart, R. (1977). A Model of Corporate Financing Decisions. The Journal Of Finance, 32(5), 
1467. 
 
Tang, J. (2017). CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating roles of other executives 
and blockholding outside directors. European Management Journal, 35(3), 362-372. 
Thies, C., & Klock, M. (1992). Determinants of capital structure. Review Of Financial 
Economics, 1(2), 40-52.  
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988). The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice. The Journal 
of Finance, 43(1), 1–19. 
 
Torchia, M., Calabrò, A., & Huse, M. (2011). Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From 
Tokenism to Critical Mass. Journal Of Business Ethics, 102(2), 299-317. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. 













Table A.III: Descriptive statistics decomposed by Index 
This table presents the descriptive statistics decomposed by stock market index. Specifically, the descriptive 
statistics of the firms listed in the S&P 500 and the Stoxx Euro 600 over the period of 2010 to 2017 are separately 
displayed. 
Variables 
Num. of Obs. 
Per year 
Avg. Mean Avg. Std. Dev. 
 
Panel A: Board composition S&P 500 
  
  
Nationality mix 262 .141 .176 
Board size 262 11.1 2.1 
Critical mass (dummy) 262 .124 .330 
Blau diversity index 262 .582 .214 
% of female directors 262 .189    .088 
% of independent directors 262 .739 .155 
CEO duality (dummy) 262 .434 .495 
    
Panel B: Board composition Stoxx Euro 600        
    
Nationality mix 242 .371 .256 
Board size 242 11.3 5.1 
Critical mass (dummy) 242 .297 .457 
Blau diversity index 242 .607 .300 
% of female directors 242 .215 .131 
% of independent directors 242 .728 .165 
CEO duality (dummy) 242 .276 .447 
Table A.IV: Variance inflation factors (VIF) 
 
In this table the estimations for the variance inflation factors (VIF) are presented. The VIFs are calculated after 
the baseline regression (2) is performed against the book value of total liabilities. For a description of the variables 
used, refer to Table A.1 in the appendix.  
Variables VIF 
 
Nationality mix 1.07  
Board size 1.29  
Critical mass (dummy) 1.73  
Blau diversity index 1.76  
% of independent directors 1.04  
% of female directors 1.72  
CEO duality (dummy) 1.05  
Tangibility 1.13  
Market-to-book ratio 1.59  
Firm size (log) 1.35  
Profitability 1.45  
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Table A.I: Variables description 
Variables Description Source 
Panel A: Board composition   
Nationality mix A measure of nationality diversity in the board with a value ranging between 0 and 1. BoardEX 
Board size Total number of directors on the board. BoardEX 
Critical mass Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if at least 30% of the board members are female and 0 otherwise. BoardEX 
Blau diversity index A measure of gender diversity in the board with a value ranging between 0 and 1. BoardEX 
% of female directors The total number of female directors in the board divided by the board size. BoardEX 
% independent directors The total number of independent directors in the board divided by the board size. BoardEX 
CEO duality Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. BoardEX 
Panel B: Control variables    
Tangibility (TAN) Book value of fixed assets (PPE) divided by the book value of capital (at the end of the fiscal year). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Firm size (SI) Total assets as reported by the firm (at the end of the fiscal year). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Market expectations (ME) The ratio of market value of equity and book value of equity (at the end of the fiscal year). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Profitability (PR) EBITDA divided by the book value of capital (at the end of the fiscal year). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Panel C: Leverage    
Retained earnings (RE) Book value of retained earnings divided by the book/market value of capital (fiscal year-end). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
External equity (EE) Book value of total equity minus the book value of retained earnings divided by book/market value of capital 
(fiscal year-end). 
Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Long-term liabilities (LTD) Book value of total liabilities minus the book value of current liabilities divided by book capital/market capital 
(fiscal year-end). 
Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Short-term liabilities (STD) Book value of current liabilities divided by the book/market value of capital (fiscal year-end). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Total leverage (TL) Book value of total liabilities divided by the book/market value of capital (fiscal year-end). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 
Book capital (BC) Book value of total assets as reported by the firm (fiscal year-end). Compustat, Bloomberg, Orbis 








Table A.II: Descriptive statistics decomposed by year 
Descriptive statistics for the board composition characteristics over the period of 2010 to 2017, decomposed by 
year. 
Variables Num. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Nationality mix 
2010 504 .2347 .2359 
2011 504 .2425  .2414  
2012 504 .2425  .2414  
2013 504 .2514  .2460  
2014 504 .2575 .2489 
2015 504 .2665  .2546  
2016 504 .2692  .2560  
2017 504 .2732 .2579 
 
Board size 
      
2010 504 11.8 4.0  
2011 504 11.8  4.0  
2012 504 11.7 3.9 
2013 504 11.7 3.8 
2014 504 11.8 3.8 
2015 504 11.8 3.8  
2016 504 11.9 3.8 
2017  12.0 3.8 
Blau index for gender diversity       
2010 504 .4483 .2707 
2011 504 .4900  .2672  
2012 504 .5319 .2570 
2013 504 .5663 .2553 
2014 504 .6154 .2397 
2015 504 .6612 .2207 
2016 504 .7063 .2105 
2017 504 .7366 .1980 




(continued) Table A.II:  Descriptive statistics decomposed by year 
Descriptive statistics for the board composition characteristics over the period of 2010 to 2017, decomposed by 
year. 
Variables Num. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Critical mass (dummy) 
      
2010 504 .0833 .2767 
2011 504 .0972  .2966  
2012 504 .1230 .3288 
2013 504 .1607 .3676 
2014 504 .2063 .4051 
2015 504 .2599 .4390 
2016 504 .3413 .4746 
2017 504 .3869 .4875 
 
CEO duality (dummy) 
      
2010 504 .3710 .4836 
2011 504 .3810  .4861  
2012 504 .3631 .4814 
2013 504 .3571 .4796 
2014 504 .3571 .4796 
2015 504 .3492 .4772 
2016 504 .3472 .4766 
2017 504 .3452 .4760 
 
% of independent directors 
      
2010 504 .7230 .1635 
2011 504 .7319  .1625  
2012 504 .7311 .1608 
2013 504 .7322 .1584 
2014 504 .7355 .1634 
2015 504 .7354 .1584 
2016 504 .7371 .1565 
2017 504 .7423 .1593 
 
% of female directors 
      
2010 504 .1424 .1004 
2011 504 .1583  .1041  
2012 504 .1732 .1015 
2013 504 .1878 .1050 
2014 504 .2082 .1052 
2015 504 .2275 .1023 
2016 504 .2510 .1068 
2017 504 .2669 .1072 
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Table A.V:  Panel data regression results of capital structure (market values) 
This table presents the industry-and year- fixed effects panel data regression results, using the sample consisting out of 504 unique firms during the period of 2010 to 2017. In columns 
(1) to (4) the dependent variables are defined as follows: (1) retained earnings, (2) external equity, (3) long-term debt, (4) short-term debt. All dependent variables are based on market 
values of capital. Columns (5) to (8) show the results of the augmented baseline model where the variables Blau diversity index and critical mass are replaced by the variable percentage 
of female directors. The independent variables have a one period lag on the dependent variable and all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for skewness in the data 
and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman tests are performed to determine whether fixed effects are preferred over random effects. All Hausman tests yield significant results 
and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm 
level. The p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables RE EE LTD STD RE EE LTD STD 
Nationality mix 0.106 -0.107 -0.0461 0.0920** 0.0995 -0.0986 -0.0457 0.0924** 
 (0.282) (0.429) (0.441) (0.0323) (0.314) (0.466) (0.446) (0.0314) 
Board size -0.0128* -0.00299 0.00811* 0.00299 -0.0121* -0.00324 0.00802* 0.00294 
 (0.0664) (0.746) (0.0508) (0.317) (0.0828) (0.725) (0.0534) (0.324) 
% of female directors     0.0897 0.182 -0.124 0.0435 
     (0.569) (0.377) (0.190) (0.510) 
Blau diversity index 0.0908 -0.0200 -0.0479 0.0130     
 (0.194) (0.831) (0.263) (0.664)     
Critical mass  -0.0618* 0.0851* -0.00635 0.0113     
 (0.0998) (0.0930) (0.782) (0.477)     
% of independent directors -0.0907 0.144 -0.0234 0.0141 -0.100 0.155 -0.0226 0.0155 
 (0.480) (0.422) (0.764) (0.799) (0.435) (0.386) (0.772) (0.780) 
CEO duality  -0.0656** 0.0367 -0.0130 6.61e-05 -0.0656** 0.0351 -0.0130 0.000173 
 (0.0472) (0.435) (0.522) (0.996) (0.0470) (0.456) (0.520) (0.990) 
Tangibility -0.0583 -0.00117 0.165*** 0.0239 -0.0565 -0.00362 0.165*** 0.0238 
 (0.132) (0.982) (0) (0.155) (0.145) (0.943) (0) (0.157) 
Firm size 0.312*** -0.175* 0.313*** -0.00766 0.313*** -0.178* 0.314*** -0.00767 
 (1.01e-05) (0.0677) (0) (0.804) (9.77e-06) (0.0630) (0) (0.804) 
Market expectations -0.0445 -0.401*** -0.480*** -0.340*** -0.0450 -0.400*** -0.479*** -0.340*** 
 (0.211) (0) (0) (0) (0.206) (0) (0) (0) 
Profitability 0.196*** -0.183*** 0.0367* 0.0188 0.195*** -0.181*** 0.0370* 0.0187 
 (8.17e-09) (4.46e-05) (0.0771) (0.198) (9.43e-09) (5.16e-05) (0.0748) (0.200) 
Constant -2.931*** -2.354*** -2.814*** -1.787*** -2.913*** -2.370*** -2.820*** -1.787*** 
 (0) (1.24e-05) (0) (0) (0) (1.07e-05) (0) (0) 
         
R-Squared 0.1737 0.2371 0.6082 0.5362 0.1715 0.2362 0.6082 0.5355 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A.VI: Panel data regression results decomposed by index 
This table presents the industry-and year- fixed effects panel data regression results. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) represent the American stock market (U.S.) and includes 262 
unique firms. Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) represent the European stock market (EU) and includes 242 unique firms. The period from 2010 to 2017 has been analysed. The 
abbreviations RE, EE, LTD and STD stand for retained earnings, external equity, long-term equity and short-term equity respectively. The independent variables have a one 
period lag on the dependent variable and all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for skewness in the data and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman 
tests are performed to determine whether fixed effects are preferred over random effects. All Hausman tests yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, 
**, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The p-values are shown in 
the parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables RE / U.S. RE / EU EE / U.S. EE / EU LTD / U.S. LTD / EU STD / U.S. STD / EU 
         
Nationality mix 0.0454 -0.00958 -0.310 -0.202 0.00278 -0.0251 -0.00495 -0.0351 
 (0.794) (0.934) (0.281) (0.142) (0.976) (0.704) (0.942) (0.442) 
Board size -0.00266 -0.0178** -0.00996 -0.00364 0.00529 0.0143*** -0.00573 5.10e-06 
 (0.817) (0.0330) (0.595) (0.699) (0.395) (0.00159) (0.195) (0.999) 
Critical mass -0.0743 -0.101** 0.0827 0.0527 -0.0201 0.0233 -0.0203 0.0145 
 (0.231) (0.0202) (0.415) (0.294) (0.536) (0.354) (0.375) (0.383) 
Blau diversity index 0.00843 0.117 -0.0457 -0.106 -0.0408 0.0589 0.128*** -0.0116 
 (0.939) (0.170) (0.793) (0.276) (0.489) (0.225) (0.00218) (0.721) 
% of independent directors -0.0474 -0.141 -0.0633 0.152 -0.0407 0.141 0.159** 0.0435 
 (0.799) (0.388) (0.839) (0.430) (0.689) (0.128) (0.0291) (0.494) 
Board duality 0.0899** -0.0275 0.0480 0.0102 0.0147 -0.0174 0.000847 0.0526*** 
 (0.0267) (0.616) (0.484) (0.865) (0.505) (0.562) (0.957) (0.00956) 
Tangibility -0.0565 -0.101** 0.000720 0.0453 0.109*** 0.208*** 0.0325 0.0541*** 
 (0.367) (0.0252) (0.994) (0.383) (0.00224) (0) (0.228) (0.00241) 
Market expectations 0.265*** 0.313*** -0.151* -0.0843 -0.178*** -0.103*** 0.0379* -0.00948 
 (5.67e-07) (0) (0.0730) (0.108) (2.63e-10) (6.01e-05) (0.0616) (0.588) 
Profitability 0.216*** 0.106* -0.210*** -0.109* 0.0530** -0.0181 0.0241 -0.00365 
 (2.56e-07) (0.0522) (0.000745) (0.0743) (0.0173) (0.558) (0.129) (0.860) 
Firm size 0.0799 0.308*** -0.0760 -0.338*** 0.223*** 0.129*** -0.133*** -0.0893** 
 (0.475) (0.000668) (0.681) (0.00142) (0.000399) (0.00721) (0.00556) (0.0139) 
Constant -1.001* -2.787*** -2.722** -0.738 -1.514*** -2.030*** -1.058*** -0.650*** 
 (0.0992) (2.00e-09) (0.0135) (0.190) (2.29e-05) (0) (0.000231) (0.000890) 
         
Observations 1,656 1,464 1,201 1,465 1,818 1,686 1,817 1,686 
R-squared 0.3676 0.3747 0.2825 0.1830 0.3669 0.4575 0.3935 0.2996 
industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table A.VI: Cross-sectional regression results  
This table presents the cross-sectional estimation results, using the sample consisting out of 504 unique firms during the period of 2010 to 2017. The use of lagged values 
eliminates the estimations from the year 2010. In columns (1) to (8) the dependent variable is defined as the total book value of liabilities divided by the total book value of 
assets at the end of the year.  The independent variables have a one period lag on the dependent variable and all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for 
skewness in the data and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman tests are performed to determine whether fixed effects are preferred over random effects. All Hausman 
tests yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with 
robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficients. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Explanatory variables 2017 2017 2016 2016 2015 2015 2014 2014 
         
Nationality mix -0.0408 -0.0354 -0.0478 -0.0428 -0.0870 -0.0876 -0.0527 -0.0515 
 (0.472) (0.531) (0.452) (0.503) (0.165) (0.166) (0.348) (0.360) 
Board size 0.00568 0.00500 0.00867* 0.00842* 0.00595 0.00607 0.00334 0.00306 
 (0.176) (0.235) (0.0565) (0.0651) (0.193) (0.188) (0.396) (0.438) 
Blau diversity index  0.208**  0.129  -0.00901  0.0498 
  (0.0285)  (0.169)  (0.912)  (0.445) 
Critical mass   -0.0477  -0.0144  0.00272  -0.0309 
  (0.268)  (0.755)  (0.955)  (0.485) 
% of female directors 0.191  0.197  -0.0312  0.0260  
 (0.144)  (0.194)  (0.832)  (0.844)  
% of independent directors -0.000646 0.00394 -0.0566 -0.0601 -0.0422 -0.0424 0.0602 0.0579 
 (0.994) (0.965) (0.559) (0.535) (0.644) (0.643) (0.472) (0.490) 
CEO duality  0.0711** 0.0728** 0.0462 0.0462 0.0761** 0.0758** 0.0678** 0.0670** 
 (0.0178) (0.0152) (0.162) (0.162) (0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0161) (0.0175) 
Tangibility 0.00106 0.000288 0.0251 0.0247 0.0372* 0.0372* 0.00406 0.00316 
 (0.957) (0.988) (0.246) (0.255) (0.0874) (0.0875) (0.831) (0.869) 
Firm size -0.107*** -0.111*** -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.0785** 0.0209 -0.144*** -0.147*** 
 (0.000104) (6.45e-05) (9.17e-06) (7.77e-06) (0.0114) (0.518) (4.83e-08) (3.72e-08) 
Market expectations 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.124*** -0.0308 -0.0782** 0.0198 0.0215 
 (0.000901) (0.000891) (0.00369) (0.00355) (0.481) (0.0122) (0.559) (0.527) 
Profitability 0.0569* 0.0502 0.0335 0.0307 0.0209 -0.0308 0.0497* 0.0480* 
 (0.0652) (0.106) (0.318) (0.361) (0.518) (0.482) (0.0869) (0.0979) 
Constant -0.595*** -0.645*** -0.417** -0.438** -0.440** -0.468** -0.696*** -0.699*** 
 (0.00109) (0.000456) (0.0285) (0.0225) (0.0187) (0.0119) (3.43e-05) (3.29e-05) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.256 0.261 0.255 0.256 0.243 0.243 0.313 0.314 




(continued) Table A.VI:  Cross-sectional regression results  
This table presents the cross-sectional results, using the sample consisting out of 504 unique firms during the period of 2010 to 2017. The use of lagged values eliminates 
the estimations from the year 2010. In columns (1) to (8) the dependent variable is defined as the total book value of liabilities divided by the total book value of assets at 
the end of the year.  The independent variables have a one period lag on the dependent variable and all financial variables are logarithmized in order to account for skewness 
in the data and improve normality in the error terms. Hausman tests are performed to determine whether fixed effects are preferred over random effects. All Hausman tests 
yield significant results and indicate the use of fixed-effects. ***, **, * Represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. T-statistics are adjusted with 
robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The p-values are shown in the parentheses under the coefficients. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) 
Explanatory variables 2013 2013 2012 2012 2011 2011 
       
Nationality mix -0.00994 -0.0108 0.00632 0.00900 0.0416 0.0453 
 (0.866) (0.854) (0.921) (0.887) (0.502) (0.467) 
Board size 0.00358 0.00299 0.00503 0.00449 0.00503 0.00503 
 (0.369) (0.453) (0.228) (0.282) (0.198) (0.199) 
Blau diversity index  0.0731  0.152**  0.112* 
  (0.263)  (0.0207)  (0.0764) 
Critical mass   -0.0682  -0.0599  0.0153 
  (0.173)  (0.294)  (0.791) 
% of female directors 0.0323  0.251*  0.296*  
 (0.820)  (0.0895)  (0.0508)  
% of independent directors 0.0545 0.0585 -0.0463 -0.0389 -0.0751 -0.0733 
 (0.519) (0.489) (0.596) (0.657) (0.371) (0.383) 
CEO duality  0.0473 0.0474 0.0530* 0.0520* 0.0569* 0.0564* 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.0810) (0.0863) (0.0524) (0.0546) 
Tangibility 0.00926 0.00676 0.00483 0.00357 -0.00755 -0.00791 
 (0.644) (0.737) (0.817) (0.864) (0.702) (0.689) 
Firm size -0.173*** -0.175*** -0.183*** -0.186*** -0.218*** -0.219*** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Market expectations 0.0340 0.0351 0.0612 0.0622 0.0790** 0.0798** 
 (0.322) (0.307) (0.137) (0.131) (0.0207) (0.0195) 
Profitability 0.0338 0.0328 0.0134 0.00994 0.000897 -0.00133 
 (0.253) (0.266) (0.667) (0.749) (0.976) (0.965) 
Constant -0.645*** -0.660*** -0.538*** -0.552*** -0.442*** -0.445*** 
 (0.000109) (7.67e-05) (0.00222) (0.00167) (0.00784) (0.00756) 
       
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.320 0.323 0.322 0.326 0.3453 0.346 
